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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I. AIM 
The aim of this thesis is to examine whether the Protection of Investment Act
1
 (POI Act) is a 
practical and suitable alternative to the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) regime. It will be argued that 
the POI Act represents a missed opportunity for South Africa to develop a holistic BIT policy based 
on reciprocity, and as such fails as a viable investment protection alternative. 
II. BACKGROUND/CONTEXT 
South Africa has been undergoing a difficult and lengthy process of change in the regulation of its 
foreign investment. From a period where the BIT reigned supreme, we have now seen this reign come 
to an end, with the ouster being the much debated national protection of investment regime, in the 
guise of the Protection of Investment Act No 22 of 2015 (which was signed into law by the president 
of the Republic of South Africa on 13 December 2015). 
As is typical with most significant changes of the status quo, the move away from BITs has 
been met with much uncertainty and consternation, and even outright objection from trading partners 
(and their host countries) and civil society alike. So controversial has been the proposal of a national 
investment protection regime that applies equally to South Africans and foreigners alike, that some 
trading partners have threatened to move their business away from South Africa to other, more 
‘investor-friendly’ nations. According to a statement released by the Democratic Alliance, South 
Africa’s official opposition party, on the Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill
2
: 
‘All of us know that this is a bad bill. How do we know? Because foreign investors told us. 
Every foreign investor that came to our committee told us in unambiguous terms that if this 
bill passes‚ they will be less likely to invest in SA. More than 80% of all foreign investors in 
SA‚ representing an enormous R2-trillion in investment over the past 20 years‚ told us that 
this is a bad bill.’ 
This so-called ‘bad bill’ was published in the official Government Gazette on 15 December 
2015.
3
 Barring a constitutional challenge, the POI Act will remain part of South African law in its 
current form.  
                                                          
1
 Act No 22 of 2015 
2
 As it was then known. This statement was reported in BDLive on 17 November 2015, before the Bill was 
passed into law. Author unknown ‘DA calls for rethink of investment protection bill’ available at  
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2015/11/17/da-calls-for-rethink-of-investment-protection-bill, accessed 
on 30 April 2016 
3
 Government Gazette No 39514, Volume 606 
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In order to understand what all the fuss about the POI Act is, it is necessary to first understand 
the international investment regime that pre-dated it, in the form of BITs.  
Of course, simply understanding the impact of the new legislative provisions in respect of 
investment protection would not be sufficient to understand why this change has been met with such 
robust lobbying and resistance, from when it was first proposed in 2013 right until before the 
promulgation of the Act (as evidenced in the statement by the official opposition party quoted above 
and various media statements by investors and interested parties)
4
 and even thereafter.  In order to 
truly understand the impact of this new regime of investment protection, one must first understand the 
state of affairs under the BIT regime and why the move away from BITs was perceived as crucial for 
South Africa (i.e. one must conduct a comparison of the state of affairs under BITs and compare this 
to the legislative mechanisms to alter this status quo as set out in the POI Act, together with an 
understanding as to why this was perceived as a necessary policy response).  
III. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This chapter sets the scene for the question under examination in this thesis. Chapter 2 briefly 
explores the history and development of BITs, in order to demonstrate the economic and legal 
rationale for the development of these instruments for protection of investments between States. Once 
there is a general understanding of the background to these investment protection instruments, 
Chapter 3 will examine the standard clauses contained in the BITs entered into by South Africa to 
date, through a desktop review of publically available BITs. Chapter 4 will then introduce one of the 
main catalysts for a review of the BIT regime, the Foresti arbitration, through which a group of Italian 
and Luxembourgish investors alleged that, through legislating various affirmative action measures to 
redress apartheid injustices, South Africa had violated specific BIT obligations, namely protection 
against expropriation, fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors and national treatment 
standards. In the course of Chapter 4, the author will examine the BIT claims relied on by the 
Claimants against South Africa during international arbitration, and briefly summarise South Africa’s 
responses to these claims.  Chapter 5 will then focus on the BIT review undertaken by South Africa, 
which was largely necessitated by the elements in dispute in the Foresti arbitration and its 
unsatisfactory outcome. Chapter 5 will highlight some of the perceived limitations and objectionable 
clauses contained in BIT’s, together with the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) BIT macro 
                                                          
4
 Linda Ensor ‘Business raises alarm over investment bill’ Business Day Live 19 February 2015, available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2015/02/19/business-raises-the-alarm-over-investment-bill; Babalo Ndenze 
‘Parliament warned that Investment Bill will scare off investors’ Sunday Times 16 September 2015, available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2015/09/16/Parliament-warned-that-Investment-Bill-will-scare-
off-investors; Peter Draper and Azwipheleli Langalanga ‘Does the draft investment bill threaten foreign 
investors’ rights?’ 2 April 2014 available at http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/draft-investment-bill-
requires-amendment; Natalie Greve ‘Germans warn of investment retreat following signing of investment bill’ 
Engineering News 28 January 2016 available at germans-warn-of-investment-retreat-following-signing-of-
investment-bill-2016-01-28. All websites listed were accessed on 30 April 2016. 
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and micro policy recommendations, which eventually culminated in a decision by the Cabinet of 
South Africa that South Africa should cancel and/or not renew the historic BITs it had entered into, 
but rather replace these treaties with a holistic investment protection regime, applicable to both South 
African and foreign investors alike,  to be ushered in through the POI Act. Chapter 6 will then provide 
a substantive assessment of the POI Act and its likely impact, the purpose of which will be to examine 
whether the POI Act, objectively, provides satisfactory responses to the limitations highlighted in the 
DTI BIT review. If this is the case, then the POI Act may be considered successful, and may represent 
a suitable alternative to the problematic BIT regime, which may be replicated in other jurisdictions. In 
order to do so, and once the perceived limitations in the BIT approach have been identified and also 
the policy concerns that have arisen through earlier chapters explored, Chapter 6 will then include a 
clause by clause analysis of the POI Act in order to determine whether this legislation could resolve 
the issues that have arisen under the BIT regime. Chapter 7 will discuss the POI Act (its successes, 
any notable omissions and apparent flaws) by evaluating the POI Act against the foreign investment 
policy aims detailed in the DTI BIT Policy Framework Review in order to determine whether there 
are any apparent limitations in the text of the POI Act in meeting the objectives set out in the trade 
policy review (this is of course limited to a textual review as no jurisprudence has yet developed in 
interpreting the meaning of the provisions of the POI Act). Based on the discussions set out in 
Chapter 7, the author will then set out her conclusions in relation to the question under investigation.  
IV. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 
Throughout this thesis, the focus is on those particular aspects of the BITs that could prevent or limit 
South Africa from pursuing legitimate public policy objectives – as highlighted in the Government 
Position Paper entitled Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review published by the DTI 
during June 2009 (BIT Policy Framework Review), and brought to the fore in the Foresti
5
 
arbitration.  The focus of this review is not on all aspects of BIT’s, and a detailed analysis of the 
macro and micro economic or political rationale for their conclusion, or their efficacy in attracting 
foreign direct investment, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Our focus will be particularly on those 
aspects of BITs that may, directly or indirectly, impact on South Africa’s right to pursue legitimate 
policy objectives (particularly in regard to human rights considerations) due to specific BIT 
limitations. The purpose of the examination of the Foresti arbitration proceedings initiated under 
South African BITs is to serve as an example of the inroads into the policy sphere that BITs may 
cause.  
Of course, for much of the same reasons as apply to South Africa (which will be elaborated 
on in later chapters, but including uncertain business environments and wanting to foster investor 
                                                          
5
 This is a reference to the international arbitration initiated by Piero Foresti  et al against the Republic of South 
Africa, which is explored in more detail in Chapter 4 below. 
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confidence to invest, desire to be regarded as part of the community of nations and to be regarded as a 
jurisdiction friendly towards foreign investment), many other developing, and particularly, African 
countries, have entered into similar BITs the terms or application of which may also be problematic 
for these developing countries. In this paper, the author will examine whether protection of 
investment (as represented through the POI Act) can be a workable, and very importantly, sustainable 
alternative to BIT’s for these countries as well. Based on the findings set out in Chapter 5, the author 
will then be in a position to opine on whether a national protection of investment regime, as 
represented in the POI Act, could represent a viable alternative to the current BIT regime, which 
could be exported to other nations.  
CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BITS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is a multitude of scholarly articles that describe in great detail the history of BITs and their 
process of development as a tool to regulate foreign direct investment. It will not be possible to set out 
detailed explanations of all these accounts, and the author will instead summarise the position, based 
on the literature reviews conducted. 
II. PRE-1994  
South Africa had no history of negotiating BITs before 1994, subsequent to which there was a flurry 
of conclusion of these treaties by the democratically elected government. At least 27 BITs were 
concluded during the African National Congress’ first term in power — commonly referred to as first-
generation BITs — and it is believed that this was largely to demonstrate that the ‘New South Africa’ 
was open for business as an investor-friendly destination.
6
 However, by the time that South Africa 
started concluding BITs, BITs had already been a common means to regulate and protect foreign 




III. COMMERCIAL RATIONALE FOR BITSs 
For as long as there has been a flow of investments across borders, there has been a need to protect 
these investments, in the interests of all parties. Without oversimplifying the complicated journey 
towards BITs, BIT arose to enhance the (largely commercial) interests of the following parties — the 
investor having ploughed capital into a project in a third country seeks a return, the capital importing 
country has an interest in encouraging the investment into its country, whilst the capital exporting 
                                                          
6
 See the DTI BIT Policy Framework review which leads with the assertion that ‘the democratically elected 
government of the time had to demonstrate that the [Republic of South Africa] was an investment friendly 
destination…’, at page 5. 
7
 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’, 38 Va. J. Int'l L.639 (1997), at page 640. 
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country seeks protection of its nationals and their investments in other states. Prior to the entry into of 
BITs, international standards relating to the regulation of foreign investments was uncertain, and no 
rule of customary international law existed in relation to the protection of these investments, nor in 
relation to the standards of compensation that would apply in the case of expropriation of 
investments.
8
 In the face of this uncertainty, BITs provided welcome legal clarity.  
 
BITs represent a contractual agreement between home
9
 and host states
10
 that govern all 
matters relevant to the regulation of investment flowing between those states, and created certainty 
and clarity as to the rules that would apply to the investment as well as the standards of treatment that 
would apply to the investor, without the need to have recourse to opaque principles of customary 
international law. BITs served to regulate the standards of behavior that would apply, and that an 
investor of a home state was entitled to expect from the host state in which it had invested. In addition 
to setting the standards of behavior that investors were entitled to receive, BITs often also set out the 
acceptable methods of dispute settlement between investors and host states, in relation to investments 
caught within the ambit of the BIT. The legal certainty provided by BITs was extremely attractive, 
such that, by 1996 it was estimated that at least 1000 BITs had been signed and ‘almost every country 
on the globe a party to at least one such treaty.’
11
 
IV. BITS ARE FREELY NEGOTIABLE 
Countries, both developed and developing, are free to negotiate and conclude BITs with their trading 
partners as they see fit and in the exercise of their sovereign powers.
12
 Whilst BITs are in principal 
matters to be negotiated, the rise of standard-form or model BITs meant that, in practice, states would 
often find themselves negotiating changes to the model format, and not necessarily creating an 
investment agreement ab initio.
13
 BIT’s generally contain clauses regulating
14
: the definition of 
                                                          
8
 Ibid, at page 646 to 665, sets out a good summary of the international journey towards BITs, from disputes 
relating to expropriation by newly sovereign states, the failure to establish a rule of customary international law 
relating to the standard of ‘prompt, adequate and effective’ compensation, the adoption of United Nations 
Resolution 3281 in 1974 (the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States) which recognised the right of 
States to ‘regulate  and exercise authority over foreign investment’ and to nationalize or expropriate property 
against the payment of appropriate compensation, the amount of which may be determined through local dispute 
resolution mechanisms unless otherwise agreed, and the eventual rise of BITs as the principal means through 
which states regulated foreign investment.  
9
 In BITs, this refers  to the state whose investor has invested into a foreign state. 
10
 In BITs, this refers to the state which has received the investment by the home state’s national. 
11
 Rudolph Dolzer and Margrete Stevens ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1995) 
12
 Of course, as with most matters of international law and relations between states, the free exercise of these  
rights may be curtailed through political pressure by other states or even bullying as a result of an unequal 
distribution of power between negotiating states. Politics aside, BITs are in principle freely negotiable. 
13
 Op cit note 6, at page 654. Individual countries such as the United States and Canada have both developed 
model BIT’s, whilst multilateral organisations such as the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development have also developed such treaties for use by their members. To date, South Africa does not have 
any model BITs, but a draft treaty is being developed for use in ‘exceptional circumstances’ under the POI Act. 
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investments, treatment of foreign investors and their investments in host states (the standards of most-
favoured nation and like treatment usually apply), the duration, termination and renewal of the BIT, 
protection from expropriation and the compensation payable in the event of expropriation, dispute 
regulation between investors and host states, sunset clauses (periods for which the investment 
protection set out in the BIT will continue to apply, even after termination of the BIT), and exceptions 
to the standards of protection set out in the BIT. The impact of some of these standard clauses as 
contained in the BITs concluded by South Africa will be examined in later chapters.  
In line with the global trend of regulating foreign investment through BITs, South Africa 
concluded a number of such treaties, particularly with European countries.  
CHAPTER 3: SOUTH AFRICAN BIT PRACTICES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Now that the scene for a discussion has been set, and the global impetus behind BIT’s demonstrated, 
it is necessary to consider some typical provisions of the BIT’s that South Africa has concluded to 
date (the focus for this Chapter is on the treaty provisions themselves, whilst later chapters will 
analyse possible impacts of these provisions). This review is based on a desktop analysis of the BIT’s 
made publicly available through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website 
(for these purposes, the assumption is that these records are up to date).
15
 For review purposes, all 
treaties that are available in English and have entered into effect (whether or not these may have 
subsequently been terminated) have been reviewed.  This includes BIT’s concluded with the 
following countries: the Kingdom of the Netherlands
16
; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland
17
; the Federal Republic of Germany
18
; the Czech Republic
19
; the People’s Republic 
of China
20
; the Kingdom of Denmark
21
;  the Republic of Finland
22





; the Federal Republic of Nigeria
25





 and the Republic of Mauritius
28
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
14
 Op cit note 10 — The authors conclude that BITs entered into across the world are largely similar in 
substance.  
15
 UNCTAD Policy Hub, South Africa BITs, available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195 , accessed on 20 June 2016. 
16
 Dated 9 May 1995. 
17
 Signed by South Africa on 20 September 1994, instruments of ratification exchanged on 27 May 1998. 
18
 Dated 11 September 1995. 
19
 14 December 1998. 
20
 Dated 30 December 1997. 
21
 Dated 22 February 1996. 
22
 Copy unsigned, but dated 1998. 
23
 Dated 19 November 1998. 
24
 Dated 7 July 1995. 
25
 Dated 29 April 2000. 
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The treaties that did not enter into effect have not been reviewed, as it would be difficult to 
conclude whether or not the treaty text provided on the UNCTRAL website actually represented final 
drafts. It would also be difficult to conclude whether the treaty text provided had been acceptable to 
both parties, or whether the treaty adoption process had stalled for some reason. For these reasons, a 
review of such treaties may not be reliable for present purposes. Due to language limitations, BITs 
that were not concluded in English have not been reviewed.  
It is interesting to note that, out of the 13 BIT’s that have been reviewed, at least 11 of these 
qualify as ‘first-generation’ BITs that were concluded during the period between 1994 and 1998 – 
which seems to give credence to the theory advanced in the by the DTI task team set up to review 
South African BITs (the review findings are set out in further detail in Chapter 5 below) that the 
newly-democratic South Africa used BIT’s as a tool to open South African borders to the rest of the 
world.  
II. BIT PROVISIONS 
Through a review of the relevant BIT’s, there are many clauses that are similar, if not identical across 
BIT’s. For the purposes of this analysis, the author will not set out in detail all ‘vanilla’
29
 clauses but 
only those considered relevant in the context of the review. These vanilla clauses include the 
definition of investments which is largely similar across all BIT’s reviewed (and includes movable 
and immovable property, shares and other interests in companies, intellectual property rights and 
business licenses and concessions) and the scope of ‘nationals’ protected under the BIT’s (both 
natural and juristic persons). The purpose of undertaking this review of BIT’s is to ascertain the 
contractual obligations in relation to foreign investment that South Africa has agreed to, together with 
the level of standardisation across BITs. Once there is a view on these BIT contractual obligations, 
this will contribute to a determination as to whether there is a correlation with the problem under 
investigation – in other words, this will facilitate an examination of whether the BIT provisions as 
drafted could allow encroachment on legitimate policy space. The aim of this review is to demonstrate 
whether the terms of the BIT’s have contributed to, if not actually created, the problems emphasised 
in the DTI BIT Policy Review (and detailed in Chapter 5 below).  
III. BIT FUNDAMENTALS 
As mentioned above, it is essential to first understand the BIT regime before attempting to 
provide any comment on whether, if at  all, and to what extent, the recently promulgated POI Act will 
have any impact  in addressing the  ‘mischief’ perceived in the BITs as determined in the DTI BIT 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
26
 Dated 3 November 1997. 
27




 This term is used to denote the most basic, common terms across BITs. 
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Policy Review. Before continuing, it is worth noting a few points in relation to BITs as a legal 
instrument. First, BITs are reciprocal in nature – every protection is provided to both treaty parties 
equally. Second, even though BITs are concluded between sovereign states, the BIT protections are 
provided to nationals of each state, and not to the state itself. On the face of it, BITs are drafted 
between sovereign nations who should (theoretically) find themselves in equal bargaining positions. 
However, BIT’s are actually drafted on the basis that there is an inherent inequality for the foreign 
national investing in a host state who may otherwise be subjected to the whims of a host state, to its 
detriment. The result is that the BITs are tipped heavily in favour of nationals, and host state power to 
deal with investments is often restricted by BITs. It is also important to bear in mind that, even though 
BIT protections are reciprocal, realistically, it is the capital importing party, the host state, that will be 
required to provide the BIT protections to nationals of the home state (capital exporting country).
30
 
See table A setting out some of the salient provisions across South African BITs, which are 
relatively standardised across most BITs. For this table, those specific provisions that were referenced 
in the Foresti review and subsequent DTI BIT Policy Framework review have been extracted 
(Chapters 4 and 5 below respectively). Table A highlights the following standard provisions across all 
13 BITs reviewed: retrospective applicability, fair and equitable treatment, most favoured nation 
treatment, protection from expropriation, standard of compensation for expropriation, applicable 
exceptions, dispute settlement and any applicable sunset clauses.
31
 Table A will be referenced in later 
Chapters. 
CHAPTER 4: THE FORESTI ARBITRATION – THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR 
SOUTH AFRICAN BIT’S 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The author has briefly set out above some explanations for the development of BITs globally, together 
with a précis of some of the standard clauses commonly featured in South African BITs. The author 
now turns to address the impact of the conclusion of two specific BITs on South Africa, which came 
to the fore through international arbitration in 2007. The relative standardization across BITs, as 
reflected in Table A, means that it is logically permissible to impute these impacts to all other South 
African BITs containing similar (if not identical) clauses as those in dispute in the Foresti arbitration. 
                                                          
30
 In the modern investment landscape it is possible that in any BIT relationship, parties act as both capital 
importers and exporters vis a vis each other. In most developing countries however, the developing country is 
typically the capital importing country, required to provide protections to foreign nationals. 
31
 Sunset clauses in BITs govern the period for which the contract will remain valid after termination i.e. the 




II. FORESTI BACKGROUND 
On 8 November 2006, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) received a request for the institution of arbitration proceedings under the Additional Facility 
Arbitration Rules from certain Italian and Luxembourgish investors (the Claimants) against South 
Africa (which will be referred to as the Foresti arbitration throughout this thesis).
32
 The proceedings 
were based on an alleged breach by South Africa of the BITs it had entered into with Italy
33
 and with 
the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union respectively.
34
 The crux of the Claimants’ claim was the 
alleged expropriatory effect of South Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
Number 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), which required, amongst other things, that mining companies 
operating in South Africa achieve 26 per cent ownership by historically disadvantaged South 
Africans.
35
 South Africa (the Respondent in the arbitration) argued that, even if there had been 
expropriation of the mining rights held by the Claimants (which it disputed), this was taken for 
important public purposes unique to the South African landscape.
36
 Of particular interest in this matter 
was the filing of submissions by non-disputing parties (which was authorized by the arbitration 
Tribunal) which focused on the human rights implications of the claim (which will be elaborated on in 
further detail below). A detailed review of the Claimants’ and Respondents submissions is not 
appropriate (or necessary) for present purposes, however, it will be useful to sketch a brief 
background of this arbitration and the final award rendered in order to understand the impact that this 
arbitration had on South Africa’s approach to BITs and the investment protection snowball that it set 
in motion.  
III. THE CLAIM 
The Claimants alleged in their memorial that, through South Africa’s adoption of a raft of legislative 
and regulatory changes in the mining sector (including the MPRDA and the Mining Charter), the 
following breaches of South Africa’s BITs with Italy and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union 
occurred: 
                                                          
32
  The Claimants were Italian nationals, the Foresti and Conti families, and Finstone s.à.r.l, a company 
incorporated in Luxembourg. See the award for this arbitration, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/1, published on 4 
August 2010, which sets out a synopsis of this matter, from the initial request to the handing down of the award. 
33
 Entered into on 9  June 1997. 
34
 Entered into on 14 August 1998. 
35
 The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act was part of a number of legislative measures 
designed to address the systemic inequality and devastating legacy caused by apartheid legislation, and formed 
part of South Africa’s broad-based black economic empowerment strategy. See the DTIs publication ‘South 
Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment’, available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee-strategy.pdf, accessed on 1 July 2016. The term 
‘historically disadvantaged persons’ refers to Black African, Coloured and Indian persons who were 
disadvantaged under the apartheid system of racial inequality and economic segregation.  
36
 This included ameliorating the disenfranchisement of historically disadvantaged South Africans who were 
largely excluded from the South African economy and other negative effects of apartheid policy, and also 
reducing the economically harmful concentration of mineral rights in a small percentage of the (white) 
population. See Respondents Objections to jurisdiction and admissibility and Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 
Case No ARB(AF)/07/1 (Respondent’s countermemorial) para 562, 57-122, and 561. 
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 the common law mineral rights leased/owned by the Claimants’ operating companies in terms 
of the previous legal regime had been expropriated (either directly or indirectly) through the 
introduction of a requirement to apply for a license to continue mining where these ‘old 
order’
37
 mining rights were held (the MPRDA introduced a system of State custodianship of 
natural resources, which required a license from the State to undertake mining activities. All 
‘old order’ mining rights were required to be updated and licenses applied for within a certain 
period, in order to continue mining activities). This breached the protections against 
expropriation included in the BITs; 
 the introduction of a requirement that historically disadvantaged South Africans should hold 
at least 26 per cent equity in mining companies amounted to an expropriation of the 
Claimants shares in the operating companies that were conducting the mining activities, in 
violation of the BIT protections against expropriation (as this requirement effectively meant 
that the Claimants would have to be divested of part of their shareholdings in local mining 
companies in order to comply with the MPRDA and Mining Charter); 
 The favourable treatment accorded to historically disadvantaged South Africans under the 






 the provisions relating to fair and equitable treatment and national treatment in the referenced 
BITs had been breached. Under this claim, the Claimants put forward a number of assertions 
to support their claim that the fair and equitable treatment provisions had been breached.   
o First, the Claimants alleged that the MPRDA and the Mining Charter were ‘blunt 
instruments’ that were not sufficiently tailored to the unique circumstances and 
peculiarities of the Claimants business (a family business operating within the 
dimension stone industry), with the result that compliance by the Claimants business 
would be objectively impossible.
40
 
o The Claimants argued that historically disadvantaged South Africans had been treated 
more favourably under the new mining legislation and that foreign investors had been 
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 Used in the MPRDA to refer to those mining rights held under the terms of previous legislation (prior to the 
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 Here, the Claimants also raised an in-principle objection to 
the application of measures designed to address the legacy of apartheid to their 
investments, as they argued that they had only invested into South Africa after the 
unbanning of the ANC and had, as a result, not actually benefitted from any apartheid 
policies. According to the Claimants, they were not beneficiaries of the apartheid 




o the Claimants suggested maladministration on the part of the Department of Minerals 
and Energy in processing license applications
43
 and also a lack of transparency and 
predictability in implementation of the MPRDA.
44
 The Claimants also invoked the 
most-favoured nation clause contained in both BIT’s
45
 to compare the ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ requirements in the Italy and Belgo-Luxembourg BIT to the 
corresponding provision in the French-South Africa BIT
46
, which read: 
‘Each Contracting Party shall accord fair and equitable treatment in accordance with the 
principles of International Law to investments made by nationals and companies of the other 
Contracting Party in its territory or in its maritime area, and shall ensure that the exercise of 
the right thus recognized shall not be hindered in law or in practice 
In particular though not exclusively, any restriction on the purchase or transport of raw 
materials and auxiliary materials, energy and fuels, as well as the means of production and 
operation of all types, any hindrance of the sale or transport of products within the country 
and abroad, as well as any other measures that have a similar effect, shall be considered as 
de jure or de facto impediments to fair and equitable treatment.’
47
  
According to the Claimants, the French BIT extended the scope of the fair and equitable 
treatment obligations to include a ‘positive duty of the State to remove hindrances’ whether practical 
or legal. The assertion continued that, through the application of the most-favoured nation treatment, 
the Claimants were entitled to this same level of heightened protection as French investors are 
accorded in terms of the French-South Africa BIT.  The Claimants relied on this clause to argue that 
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South Africa was obliged to remove legal hindrances to foreign investment, in this case, the MPRDA 
and Mining Charter. 
Notably, the Claimants did not at any stage in their memorial challenge the policy rationale of 
the MPRDA or the Mining Charter in the context of democratic South Africa (South Africa lead 
detailed argument on this, which will be covered below).  
IV. RESPONSE 
South Africa responded to the Claimants claims through a detailed 451-page submission, dated 27 
March 2009.
 48
 Before responding to each one of the Claimants specific claims in relation to breach of 
the BITs, South Africa first contextualized the dispute through a thorough examination of apartheid’s 
segregationist and discriminatory policies and their effects in the mining arena, which it argued 
necessitated the development of the MPRDA and Mining Charter. Although it is beyond the scope of 
the present thesis to deconstruct the impact of the apartheid policies and subsequent legislative 
interventions, it is necessary to sketch a high-level overview of South Africa’s arguments as to why 
the regulation of mining and mineral rights (and the introduction of affirmative action measures) 
should be viewed as a human right in a democratic South Africa.  
a) The link between apartheid and mining 
Through its submission, South Africa contended that minerals and mining in South Africa were a 
‘special case’.
49
 Unlike in other countries where mineral rights and mining could simply be regarded 
as a commercial activity, the deep links between mining and apartheid policies (which weaved a 
complex web of discrimination and segregation that ensured that an uneducated, disenfranchised, 
cheap black labour force would be available at the behest of white mine owners), such that ‘the 
mining industry was a direct beneficiary’
50
 of apartheid policies, merited a different approach. 
In its green paper dated 3 February 1998, the Department of Minerals and Energy
51
 observed that 
‘almost all privately-owned mineral rights are in white hands’. This of course was no coincidence but 
the result of carefully orchestrated social engineering though a number of pre apartheid policies and 
apartheid legislation
52
, such as: 
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 Restrictions on land ownership by black people, together with the creation of ‘homelands’ 
and forced removals of black people from areas designated for white persons; 
 With ownership of minerals in the soil being linked to land ownership under the then laws, 
restrictions on land ownership effectively meant that black people were also restricted in 
owning minerals and rights to mine them; 
 Land ownership restrictions further contributed to the creation of a large migrant labour force, 
with black people being forced to seek employment away from the homelands (which were 
unable to support the entire black population) and in the mines; 
 The Mines and Works Act No 12 of 1911 allocated predominantly unskilled work to black 
workers, preventing any skills transfer from white workers and later apartheid legislation 
ensured that black workers were confined to low-skill and low-paying jobs, and guaranteed 
that no white worker would ever be subordinate to a black worker; 
 Wages for black mine workers were kept significantly lower than those of white mine 
workers, often below subsistence level; 
 Black education policy served to ensure that blacks could not aspire to certain positions 
within society and also inculcated an inferiority to whites; 
 Blacks were not afforded any meaningful political or labour rights.  
At Chapter IV of its Counter-memorial, South Africa alleged that the apartheid policies 
constituted a ‘grave and continuous breach’ of the international law prohibition on racial 
discrimination which the democratic South Africa not only had to discontinue, but also was required 
to actively remedy.
53
 The 1993 interim Constitution
54
 and the 1996 final constitution
55
 would lay the 
domestic foundation to remedy this inequality through the express authorization to take legislative and 
other affirmative action measures to promote the achievement of equality by persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination.
56
 South Africa contended that it was thus under a constitutional mandate (in 
addition to the international law mandate mentioned above) to enact the legislative measures under 
investigation in the current dispute – the MPRDA and the Mining Charter.
57
 
After sketching the consequences of apartheid policy on the mining industry, and the international 
law and constitutional mandate to remedy these consequences through affirmative action measures, 
the Respondent answered the Claimants allegations of breach of the BITs. These responses are 
summarized below. 
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b)  Expropriation claims 
The responses to the expropriation claims are dealt with at Chapter X of the Respondents counter-
memorial.  On South Africa’s version, no expropriation of common law mineral rights had 
occurred as the Claimants and their operating companies factually continued to operate the 
mining businesses profitably, as they did pre-MPRDA – South Africa stated that they ‘continue to 
exploit the same quarries, carry out the same activities there, and sell the product to the same 
markets’
58
 in favour of its argument (in other words, the mere entry into force of the MPRDA was 
not sufficient to sustain a claim of expropriation as the Claimants’ business had continued as 
usual and there has been no deprivation). Additionally, no expropriation of 26 per cent equity in 
the operating companies had occurred through a ‘compulsory equity divestiture’ as argued by the 
Claimants, and South Africa showed that there were a number of other methods through which 
the Claimants could have reached the required equity thresholds (in fact, using a beneficiation 
offset could have reduced the historically disadvantaged South African ownership requirements to 
just 5 per cent).
59
 According to South Africa, the claim of expropriation of 26 per cent equity was 
‘speculative at best’ given that the Claimants had not explored other allowable means of meeting 
the equity requirement.  
South Africa further alleged that, even if it could have been proven that an expropriation, 
whether direct, indirect or through equivalent measures had occurred, such expropriation would 
not have been unlawful in the context of the BIT’s.
60
 South Africa argued that both the Italy and 
Belgo-Luxembourg BIT expressly permitted governments to expropriate investments, provided 
that the expropriation was made: 
 For public purposes  or in the national interest; 
 In exchange for ‘immediate, full and effective compensation’61 or against ‘prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation’
62
; 
 On a non-discriminatory basis; and 
 Under due process of law.  
South Africa then set out its detailed arguments as to why all these requirements had been 
satisfied in the context of the alleged expropriations, thus rendering them lawful in accordance with 
the terms of the BITs.
63
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c) Fair and equitable treatment claims 
South Africa responded in detail to the Claimants allegation of a breach of the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment. This response included the following submissions:
64
  
 The allegation that the MPRDA and Mining Charter was a ‘blunt instrument’ implied that 
South Africa was required to tailor its regulatory responses to the peculiar circumstances of 
the Claimants’ business (being a small family business in a particular industry), but there was 
no international law requirement to do so. However, the inclusion of flexible means through 
which to satisfy the new MPRDA historically disadvantaged South Africa equity 
requirements, including a beneficiation offset, meant that the Claimants could elect how they 
would comply with the legislation, without necessitating a 26 per cent equity divestiture. 
Further, there was no objective impossibility of compliance for the Claimants (in fact, South 
Africa lead evidence to show that, in some instances, the Claimants’ operating companies 
were in fact able to fully satisfy the 26 per cent equity requirement for historically 
disadvantaged South Africans when they applied for, and were granted, additional new 
mining licenses – although new mining licenses were not in dispute, but rather the conversion 
of old order mining rights, it was nevertheless quite telling that the Claimants were factually 
able to meet the MPRDA equity requirements when they made an effort to do so despite their 
robust allegations to the contrary); 
 In the absence of express promises and undertakings made to investors (of  which there were 
none in the present instance), sovereign States are entitled to deference in their policy  choices 
(manifest unreasonableness excluded); 
 The Claimants, through their numerous interactions with the DME, had received ‘significant 
individualised consideration’; 
 The aim of the MPRDA and Mining Charter was not to apportion any culpability for 
apartheid, hence whether or not the Claimants had, according to their version, benefitted 
directly or indirectly from apartheid was factually irrelevant (although it was demonstrated 
through evidence that the Claimants had purchased existing companies that had operated 
during apartheid and thus had indirectly benefitted from apartheid mining policies); 
 The Claimants could hold no objective, legitimate expectation that regulation of the South 
African minerals sector would not change (the proposal to change mining regulation was one 
of the first matters that the democratic South Africa had turned its attention to, and numerous 
proposals had been published and invitations for public comment invited before the  final 
legislative texts had been adopted); 
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 Regulatory change, however significant, does not conflict with a State’s objective to provide a 
stable and predictable investment environment in terms of the BITs.  
d) National treatment claims65 
South Africa argued that there was no breach of the national treatment provisions through the 
affirmative action measures in favour of historically disadvantaged South Africans set out in the 
MPRDA and Mining Charter, as all companies operating in the mining sector wishing to obtain 
mining rights, whether local or foreign, would be bound by the same generally applicable 
requirements. Local companies that did not meet the requirements, of which there was a majority, 
would need to take steps to comply with the new requirements just as foreign companies did. 
Further, the Claimants were not in ‘like circumstances’ with historically-disadvantaged South 
Africans, and South Africa contended that there were legitimate reasons (referring back to the 
affirmative action measures designed to rectify apartheid inequalities) to differentiate the 
treatment of the Claimants (being foreigners) from that of historically disadvantaged South 
Africans.   
V. HUMAN RIGHTS SUBMISSIONS 
Four non-governmental organisations (both South African and international)
66
 sought the permission 
of the Tribunal to file written submissions as non-disputing parties (“NDPs”) pursuant to the ICSID 
Rules
67




 ‘the challenged legislation at the centre of the dispute…was enacted in South Africa for 
important public policy reasons and in furtherance of constitutionally mandated goals’ 
including the ‘pursuit of substantive equality’ and ‘the need to proactively redress the 
apartheid history of exploitative labour practices, forced land deprivations and 




 The arbitration ‘raises important questions concerning…the appropriate line between 
legitimate, non-compensable regulatory action and compensable expropriation under 
international law;’ and 
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 The fact that the arbitration will have important repercussions within South Africa from a 
policy perspective, as it raises the question of the ‘international legality of [such] 
constitutionally mandated measures’.  
To demonstrate the bleak on-the-ground realities of South Africa’s unique post-democracy 
position, the petition referred to various South African country reports which indicated that black 
South Africans remained vastly disadvantaged compared to white South Africans after more than 
a decade of democratic rule; in spheres such as access to education, formal housing, land 
ownership, access to basic services, education and their earning ability.  
The NDP’s argued that it was necessary to have a holistic appreciation of the dispute, and that 
it was insufficient to consider only the contractual provisions of the BITs in question, without 
considering other relevant domestic and international law requirements. In addition to a 
discussion around South Africa’s constitutional mandate to bring about the realization of 
substantive equality and respect for human rights, the NDP’s went further to sketch a background 
of the various treaties and conventions under international law which echoed this mandate toward 
the elimination of discrimination and the requirements to proactively take affirmative action 
measures necessary to realize such aims.
70
 
VI. THE AWARD 
The Foresti arbitration illuminated the issues that could arise when government parties to BITs 
undertake major legislative and regulatory developments in matters of national interest, which may 
conflict with the protections accorded under BITs. The arbitration serves to demonstrate how the 
provisions of BITs may operate to prevent or limit Contracting Parties’ sovereign rights to develop 
legitimate policies, even those arising from a constitutional mandate. As was the case here, the 
arbitration highlighted the juxtaposition of the commercial interests regulated in BITs, with the 
international law and constitutional imperative to eliminate racial discrimination and implement 
policies to rectify the effects of racial discrimination.  
The subject matter of the arbitration also raised important philosophical questions regarding 
whether or not it was possible to balance the need for developing countries to encourage and promote 
foreign direct investment, against the sovereign right to regulate in the national interest (and 
particularly for the aim of the progressive realization of human rights for all citizens). Of course, the 
nub of any such debate is the realization that in the case of developing countries, it is often the very 
presence of foreign direct investments that would contribute to the realization of human rights (by 
increasing the standard of living of citizens and the support that government is able to provide). Any 
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course of action that served to discourage foreign-direct investment in these instances would thus be 
an untenable and short-sighted solution. As such, one cannot simply sacrifice foreign investment at 
the altar of policy, where the ability to pursue that policy may rest of the very returns received through 
foreign direct investment – a careful balance must therefore be struck between these legitimate, and 
sometimes competing, aims.  
The Foresti arbitration succeeded in focusing our minds on both the legal and philosophical 
arguments, and the delicate relationship between commercial and human rights interests in the context 
of foreign direct investment into developing countries.  What a pity then that this matter was, 
ultimately, settled by the Parties and no award was made on the merits of either parties’ stated case. 
Unfortunately, we will have to wait for the next test case for guidance on how these sensitive matters 
are to be decided. 
On 2 November 2009, almost exactly three years from initiation of the proceedings, the 
Claimants sought South Africa’s consent to discontinue the proceedings.
71
 This was based on a 
private agreement reached between the Claimants and the Department of Minerals and Energy in 
terms of which the Claimants were granted mining rights without the 26 per cent historically 
disadvantaged South African equity divestiture contemplated in the MPRDA and the Mining Charter, 
in exchange for agreeing to a beneficiation offset coupled with a reduced 5 per cent equity divestiture. 




In the arguments on costs, both parties sought to demonstrate that they should be considered 
the prevailing party (and hence entitled to costs based on the rationale that costs follow the event) – 
the Claimants because their initiation of arbitration proceedings resulted in the mining licenses being 
renewed and the beneficiation offset agreement being entered into, and the Respondent because the 
Claimants did not actually benefit from any favourable treatment vis-à-vis other mining companies in 
the process of conversion of mining rights and as such could not have been said to have succeeded (as 
mentioned above, the MPRDA recognized various means through which to satisfy the historically 
disadvantaged equity requirements, including through a beneficiation offset).
73
  
The Tribunal was not to be drawn on these arguments, and declared that in this arbitration 
there is ‘no real winner and no real loser’.
74
 Based on the circumstances of the particular matter 
(specifically the request for discontinuance and the Claimant’s delay in doing so), the Tribunal 
decided that it would be fair and reasonable to require the Claimants to pay a portion of South 
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Africa’s costs defending the matter, to the amount of 400 000 Euro.
75
 Despite the explicit statements 
by the Tribunal that in its view neither party had prevailed in this matter, the award of costs was 
hailed as a success and South Africa’s DTI victoriously declared that the Foresti arbitration had been 
successfully concluded.
76
 What the DTI failed to mention in its victory speech however was that the 
total costs that South Africa incurred in defending the international arbitration amounted to 5 675 
467.12 Euro (of tax-payer money!).
77
 South Africa thus managed to reclaim a paltry 7 per cent of its 
costs in this matter. This fact, coupled with the beneficiation offset agreement (and possibly the 
disturbing precedent that international arbitration can be used as a tactical tool by foreign investors 
unwilling to comply with transformation legislation to bully government), hardly indicates a 
successful result for South Africa, even on a very loose interpretation of the word!  
CHAPTER 5: AFTER FORESTI – THE DTI BIT POLICY REVIEW FRAMEWORK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The arbitral challenge launched by the Foresti Claimants culminated in a review of South Africa’s 
approach to the regulation of foreign direct investment, in the form of BITs. Even though no award 
was made, the arbitration highlighted the manner in which foreign investors could use the provisions 
of BITs to block legitimate legislative and regulatory change in South Africa, or to claim 
compensation for these legitimate actions. For obvious reasons, and particularly considering the 
constitutional mandate for affirmative action as a means of rectifying apartheid injustices, this 
encroachment of legitimate policy space by foreign investors relying on historically negotiated BITs 
was considered unacceptable by South Africa and in urgent need of review. The BIT Investment 
Treaty Policy Framework review was initiated in 2005 and a dedicated Department of Trade and 
Industry Task Team assigned to this review (referred to as the DTI BIT policy review throughout this 
thesis).  During the period of review, the DTI suspended negotiation and conclusion of any additional 




As mentioned in Chapter 2, it was hardly a surprise that South Africa had no history of 
negotiating BITs prior to 1994,
79
 largely as a result of apartheid policies which lead to various 
embargoes and sanctions against South Africa. As democracy came to South Africa, so too did the 
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invitation to negotiate and BITs soon became a regular feature of democratic South Africa’s foreign 
direct investment policy. According to the conclusions reached in the DTI BIT policy review, the new 
governments’ zealousness to prove South Africa an investment-friendly destination meant that the 




II. MACRO POLICY REVIEW OUTCOMES 
The purpose of the macro-policy review was to determine South Africa’s prevailing policy and 
strategy considerations being applied to the negotiation and initiation of BITs. Pursuant to the review, 
the DTI reached the following conclusions in respect of South Africa’s macro-policy on BITs: 
 It appeared that little or no legal or economic analysis of risks associated with the conclusion 
of BITs had been performed prior to conclusion of these instruments, which culminated in a 
lack of understanding of the consequences associated with BITs;
81
 
 No holistic policy document informing the rationale for the conclusion of BITs was available; 
and South Africa’s approach seemed instead to be based on a ‘patchwork of general policy 
considerations’, which would likely differ between responsible line functions at different 
government departments; 
 The link between BITs and foreign direct investment had not been examined, and no direct 
correlation could be said to exist without such analysis (Take for instance the Foresti case — 
even though factually the Claimants decision to invest in South Africa was not taken on the 
basis of a BIT, which at the time of investment did not exist, the Claimants were able to rely 
on the provisions of a BIT that was subsequently entered into to challenge South Africa’s 
subsequent policy decisions. In such an instance, the provisions of a BIT were used, rather 
opportunistically one might argue,  against South Africa even though such BIT did not form a 
basis for the decision to invest into South Africa) ;
82
 
 Countries are not individually assessed prior to entry into of a BIT to determine most 
appropriate forms of co-operation, rather a one-size-fits-all approach is taken and a generic 
range of agreements often proposed (or accepted) regardless of our trading partner or any 
unique circumstances of South Africa’s relationship with that trading partner (for example, 
whether South Africa also exports capital to that party, or whether South Africa is solely a 
capital importer vis-a-vis that trading partner).  
The DTI’s BIT macro-policy review did not yield favorable results, but brought to light South 
Africa’s somewhat schizophrenic policy approach to BITs to date, and an urgent need to rectify this. 




 DTI BIT policy review at page 14. 
82
  DTI BIT policy review at page 22. 
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Where the macro-policy review focused on the circumstances surrounding South Africa’s conclusion 
of BITs, the micro-policy review focused instead on the substantive impact of the contractual 
provisions set out in the BITs themselves.  
III. MICRO-POLICY REVIEW OUTCOMES 
a) Review focus 
This review focused on a number of standard provisions generally found in BITs —some of which are  
highlighted in Table A above — together with the legal issues or trends that may emerge from the 
inclusion of such wording. The micro-policy review concluded with a number of policy 




b) Standard clauses 
Within this framework, the micro-policy review focused on the impact of 11 standard clauses 
found in the BITs that had been concluded by South Africa to date, and set out a policy response on 
each item that could be used to guide South Africa in their future investment protection negotiations.
84
 





the BIT preamble reflects and records the intentions and objectives of the State 
parties in concluding the BITs, providing necessary context to the BIT. Where there 
is ambiguity in interpretation of a BIT, the preamble may be used as an interpretive 
tool to determine the true intention underlying the BIT. As such, the customary 
absence of any reference to objectives broader than simply protection of investment 
could be problematic, and the DTI considered ‘it advisable to introduce more specific 
language into preambles that emphasizes that investment promotion and protection 




ii. Scope of investment clause 
BITs protect investments made by investors of the home state in a host state. This investment 
is often defined in ‘open-ended terms and following an asset-based approach,’
87
covering capital 
together with all assets of the investor. Generally, only those assets acquired for the purposes of 
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investment are protected in terms of BITs, and the investment must be made accordance with 
domestic law of the host state.
88
 Investments made by both juristic and natural persons are eligible for 
protection according to BITs, but a question has arisen as to the degree of control that a person should 
exercise over an investment for that investment to qualify for BIT protection. This was one of the 
jurisdictional elements in dispute in the Foresti case, where shareholders of certain operating 
companies (the Foresti Claimants) alleged that they had been expropriated, even though they did not 
in fact directly own the investments alleged to have been expropriated (mining rights held by South 
African established operating companies in which the foreign investors had only an indirect interest). 
The DTI also raised the international law presumption against retrospective treaty application, which 
presumption was expressly set aside in most BITs, which cover all existing investments and future 
investments. Referring back to Foresti this presumption becomes quite relevant, as the BITs under 
investigation in that arbitration were entered into pursuant to the Claimants having made their 
investments, but those investments were covered based on the retrospective application of the BITs. 
iii. Standards of treatment of investments 
 BITs contain obligations regarding the standard of treatment, whether absolute or relative, 
that must be afforded to investors by host states. Examples of absolute standards of treatment
89
 
include the obligation to provide ‘fair and equitable treatment’, ‘full protection and security’, 
protection from expropriation and free transfer of funds. According to the DTI, these absolute 
standards lack precise meaning and greater clarity should be included in BITs regarding the content of 
these standards, which will help with a determination as to when absolute standards have been 
infringed by conduct of the host states.
90
  
Relative standards ‘define the required treatment to be granted to investment by reference to 
the treatment accorded to other investments’ (i.e. through a comparison of treatment of different 
investors) and includes the obligation to provide ‘national treatment’
91
 and ‘most-favoured nation 
treatment’(MFN)
92
 to home state investors.  
According to the DTI, the national treatment provisions set out in BITs often do not 
adequately cater for exclusions to such treatment (although there are a few exceptions to this 
generalisation), and there should be express language creating such exemptions (for example, the 
requirements for affirmative action measures applicable to certain categories of nationals, in order to 
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redress historic imbalances). Whilst most BITs do cater for exemptions to MFN treatment (for 
example, by excluding the benefits accorded to investors of third nations as a result of regional 
economic integration and double tax treaties, which are often matters subject to extensive 
negotiation), they do not go far enough to establish those matters on which MFN treatment could be 
requested (for example, does this treatment extend to substantive matters related to investment 
protection only, or also purely procedural matters such as dispute resolution). Future BITs should 
include explicit language governing the claim for MFN treatment and its ambit. 
iv. Expropriation 
The protection from expropriation is one of the main drivers for conclusion of BITs and all BITs 
contain at a minimum the right of investors to be protected from unlawful expropriation by the host 
state, and define narrow criteria that must be satisfied in order for an expropriation to be considered 
lawful, namely – it must occur on a non-discriminatory basis, for a public purpose and against 
payment of compensation. The terms expropriation and nationalization are often used interchangeably 
in BITs, but these terms are not properly defined, and there is further no clarity on those acts which do 
not themselves amount to expropriation but may have an effect that is ‘equivalent to’ expropriation, 
which are also prohibited in BIT language. Of particular relevance in the South African context, the 
BITs do not recognize a distinction between ‘deprivation’ and ‘expropriation’ as those terms are 
employed in section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution), nor do 
the BITS recognize any distinction between regulation and expropriation, thus creating the possibility 
that ‘legitimate government regulation will be deemed to constitute a form of indirect 
expropriation’
93
, as was the case in the Foresti arbitration.  
Under BITs expropriation, to be lawful, must occur against compensation, and the measure of 
this compensation may be contentious. BITs generally require compensation to be ‘prompt, adequate, 
and effective’ or ‘immediate, full and effective’, or some combination of these terms, the consequence 
of which generally requires that the compensation for expropriation to be paid to investors reflects the 
market value of the expropriated investment. There is further no list of circumstances to be considered 
which may allow a host state to pay less than market-related compensation, depending on the reason 
that the expropriation was undertaken. This conflicts with the section 25 of the Constitution and the 
jurisprudence that has developed under that section, where less than market related compensation may 
be paid when considering the public interest purposes of the expropriation.
94
 Under BITs, only the 
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economic value of the expropriated investment is considered, but not the circumstances surrounding 
the expropriation nor the public purpose being fulfilled, which creates tension with South African 
law.
95
 Under the Constitution, the relevant consideration for determination of the amount of 
compensation is whether the compensation paid represents an amount that is just and equitable 
considering all relevant factors enumerated in section 25(3) (with market value being a single relevant 
factor in making this determination).
96
 
v. Transfer of funds 
 This provision ensures that investors are able to move their funds freely from host state to 
their home state, and obviously goes to the root of investment in the first place – the investor’s hope 
of reaping returns and then being able to repatriate these returns. There may be circumstances where 
this transfer may be restricted or subject to procedural requirements, such as South Africa’s exchange 
control regime, and BITs should reflect these legitimate qualifications to the free transfer of returns.  
vi. Dispute resolution 
Most BITs allow investors to ‘directly initiate arbitration with host states’ using the investor-
state dispute mechanism enshrined in BITs.
97
 There is generally no requirement for an investor to 
exhaust local legal remedies before it may initiate an international arbitration, which effectively 
allows an investor to leap-frog domestic legal systems at will. This provision was created to protect 
investors against perceived bias in domestic courts when initiating investment disputes against the 
government. However, there are many flaws in the international arbitral system including a lack of 
transparency in proceedings (which may be confidential and are not heard in open court), absence of 
an appellate process to challenge disputed rulings, appointment of arbitrators with no experience 
adjudicating complex public policy matters, no system of precedent or binding jurisprudence which 
may be relied on for legal certainty. Although not directly referenced in the DTI Policy review, the 
costs of international arbitration are also often prohibitive for developing countries – the Foresti case 
is illustrative of this, where South Africa spent a whopping 5,675,467.12
98
 Euro on legal fees alone.
99
 
The result being that developing countries may be forced to abandon legitimate claims or defenses 
under BITs, where the costs of adjudicating them could be put to better use, for example through 
building critical infrastructure, supplying free medical treatment or education to the population.   
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vii. Developmental issues 
 According to the DTI, the BIT negotiating process (and the BITs that are concluded as a result) did 
not adequately address issues of sustainable development, which are vital from the perspective of a 
developing country.
100
 Instead, existing BITs were ‘based on a 50-year old model’ that prioritizes the 
interests of investors from developed, capital-exporting home states over the developmental interests 
of host states.
101
 The DTI believed that relations between South Africa and developed home states 
were often skewed, and that any future BIT framework should aim to create more equitable relations 
between parties. Further, the sovereign right to regulate should be enshrined within BITs and 
investment protection should be balanced against other important policy objectives (such as the 
promotion of human rights). Whilst BITs set out a comprehensive set of rights that home state 
investors are entitled to receive within a host state, no corresponding obligations are placed on these 





The DTI recommended that, based on its findings, South Africa urgently review its stance on 
BITs (which encroached significantly into the policy space). This was also necessary as foreign 
investors had become aware of the possibilities of attacking legitimate government initiatives based 
on the historically concluded BITs (the Foresti arbitration and its unsatisfactory conclusion had 
received significant media attention, both locally and abroad, and left the door open for future claims 
against South Africa).  
Pursuant to this review a decision was taken by the Cabinet of South Africa in 2010 that South 
Africa would: 
 refrain from entering into further BITs absent any compelling economic or political reasons,  
 terminate existing BITs  
 develop an Act of Parliament to govern foreign direct investment into South Africa, and  
 clarify the protection of investment and how it would apply in the context of South African 
law.  
In furtherance of this decision, South Africa embarked on a process of terminating existing 
BITs and developing replacement national legislation. This legislation, the Protection of 
Investment Act, was subsequently developed and passed into law during the first half of 2016.  
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IV. Other BIT terminations 
Although the decision to terminate BITs may be considered radical, it is worth pausing here to reflect 
on similar decisions taken by other countries.  
In 2014, Indonesia announced its intention to terminate all 67 of its BITs and it appeared that 
Indonesia intended to ‘create a new bilateral investment agreement that will be adjusted to recent 
developments.’
103
 Although no reasons were cited for Indonesia’s decision, speculation was that this 
was as a result of a number of unfavorable decisions against Indonesia in investment disputes. 
104
 
In February 2016, Poland announced its intention to terminate its BITs with other European 
Member States. Amongst the reasons for this decision, Poland cited the ‘pressure’ being placed on it 
through international arbitration, as well as the fact that it had ‘reached a level of democracy’ which 




During September 2009, Ecuador announced its termination of all existing BITs, based on the 
unconstitutionality of these treaties, which incorporated a waiver of sovereign jurisdiction (the 




Although India has not yet terminated its historical BITs, it has undergone a process of 
redrafting its Model BIT to include, amongst other things, an obligation to exhaust local remedies 
prior to international arbitration. It remains to be seen whether India will renegotiate existing BITs 
based on the new model, and whether it will terminate those BITs where contracting parties refuse the 
new terms.  
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CHAPTER 6: PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT ACT REVIEW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The author now turns to examine the substantive provisions of the POI Act. The purpose of this 
review is to assess whether the POI Act could be considered successful in context. The POI Act could 
be considered successful if its meets its desired aims. For this purpose, it is necessary to examine 
whether the POI provides a satisfactory policy response to the BIT shortcomings exposed in the DTIs 
review and to which it was drafted in response.
107
 Metaphorically, if BITs are the big bad wolf baring 
its teeth when developing countries attempt to exercise their sovereign rights, could protection of 
investment represent the fabled silver bullet? 
In addition to considering whether the POI Act is able to satisfy the BIT shortcomings, it will 
also be useful to consider whether the POI Act is able to satisfy its own objects, as set out in the 
Memorandum of Objects of the POI Bill that accompanied its release. Specifically worth mentioning 
(and to which the author will return later) these objects include ‘creating a predictable business 
environment that is readily understandable to an investor’ and clarifying provisions typically found in 
BITs by codifying them. 
II. TERMINATION PROCEDURE 
Before progressing to a substantive review of the POI Act, it may be worth noting that the 
procedure through which South Africa terminated existing BITs (pursuant to the Cabinet decision to 
do so) was deemed less than satisfactory by some trading partners. South Africa simply allowed a 
number of treaties to lapse in accordance with their terms, but also summarily terminated those BITs 
that had not yet lapsed, often without any negotiation or discussion with trading partners. Whilst this 
was not a breach of the BITs (which allowed for termination on notice), it was considered a 
diplomatic faux pas and was criticized by (particularly European) trading partners as a move that 
would have a negative effect of investor confidence.
108
  
In contrast to the negative statements by European trading partners, there were also scholars 
and leading academics who lauded South Africa’s bold move as ‘pro-development’ and an example 
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that could be followed by other developing nations.
109
 The POI Act has now graduated from an 
abstract statement of policy to a fully-fledged legally binding act of parliament. It is this instrument 
that must now form the subject matter of our examination, and not any hypothetical statements that 
pre-dated its existence (as we are painfully aware as legal scholars, the devil is in the detail). The act 
must be examined on its substantive provisions and whether they are capable of meeting the desired 
aims, and without bias as to whether the procedure through which the act was arrived at, and BITS 
terminated, was optimal.  
III. POI ACT SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW 
The preamble to the POI Act provides insight into the context and background of the Act and sets out 
its statement of principle and purpose. The preamble is crafted in aspirational language and highlights, 
amongst other things, ‘the obligation to protect and promote rights enshrined in the Constitution’, 
South Africa’s commitment ‘to maintaining an open and transparent environment for investments’, 
the desire to promote investments ‘by creating an environment that facilitates processes that may 
affect investments’, the responsibility of government ‘to provide a sound legislative framework for the 
protection of all investments, including foreign investments, pursuant to constitutional obligations’, 
the necessity of a ‘balance of rights and obligations’ of investors, whilst recognizing ‘the obligation 
to take measures to protect or advance’ historically disadvantaged South Africans and South Africa’s 
right to regulate in the public interest. 
Even though the preamble of legislation is not binding, it does set the scene for the provisions 
that follow. The preamble of the POI Act succeeds in crafting a careful statement regarding the 
balance between investment protection and broader public policy objectives, and satisfies the DTI 
BIT policy review finding that specific language should be included in the preamble to emphasize 
policy objectives broader than simply investment protection.  
Section 2 of the POI Act sets out the scope of investments included within the Act. Whilst 
section 2(2) does set out a non-exhaustive list of investments which largely correlates with the 
definition of investment protected under BITs (including shares in companies, movable and 
immovable property and intellectual property), section 2(1) sets out a rather curious qualifier – any 
enterprise must be established/acquired or expanded lawfully by an investor by ‘committing resources 
of an economic value over a reasonable period of time in anticipation of profit.’ It is unclear why it 
was deemed necessary to include a timeframe for holding of an investment, nor is any guidance given 
as to what may constitute a reasonable period of time in the context of an investment. This may create 
uncertainty regarding the scope of protected investments, in contrast with the specific object of the 
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POI Act to create a predictable and readily understandable business environment. However, by 
creating a threshold for qualifying investments, the POI Act does ensure that only ‘serious’ 
investments are entitled to the protections set out in the POI Act. 
Section 3 governs interpretation of the POI Act, and provides that it is to be interpreted 
consistently with its stated purpose, the Constitution of South Africa, including the Bill of Rights, 
customary international law and international law; and any relevant convention or international 
agreement to which South Africa is a party. Although no jurisprudence exists on this point, an 
argument could be made that later BITs concluded by South Africa (South Africa has not shut the 
door on BITs completely and is in the process of drafting a Model BIT for use in BIT negotiations), or 
alternatively duly terminated BITs surviving through a sunset provision, could amount to a relevant 
international agreement to which an adjudicator could have reference when interpreting the POI Act. 
This potentially leaves the door open for recourse to BITs in interpreting the POI Act, where there 
may be uncertainty regarding the legislative position. 
The POI Act applies to all investments satisfying its investment criteria made in South Africa 
and there is no distinction between national or international investors (section 5). It is unclear why 
nationals have been brought into scope, since the review that culminated in the POI Act arose from 
the specific circumstances of a claim by a foreign investor under a BIT.
110
 On the other hand however, 
an argument could be made that it contributes to legal certainty by having a single regime applicable 
to all investments (whether domestic or foreign). As such, the author does not consider that it is a 
prima facie failing of the POI Act that nationals are included within its ambit. However, through the 
effective exclusion of home states in contrast with the BIT regime where home states are a party to 
the agreement and therefore bound by it, the POI Act does lose the benefit of possible recourse to 
home state intervention (the inclusion of home state obligations was also mooted in the DTI BIT 
policy framework review). 
Section 6 accords all investors the right to fair administrative treatment, and places an 
obligation on South Africa to ensure that administrative, legislative and judicial process do not 
operate arbitrarily or deny investors administrative or procedural justice. This standard of fair 
administrative treatment appears, at least on a plain reading, to differ from the standard of ‘fair and 
equitable treatment’ contained in BITs. There appears to be a deliberate attempt to employ a standard 
of treatment different to the BIT standard of fair and equitable treatment here, which cannot simply be 
overlooked. See Table A which sets out the standards of treatment employed in South African BITs.  
Save for the BIT concluded with Iran, every English language BIT to which South Africa is a party 
employs the standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and the choice to use different language in the 
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POI Act reflects an intention to reference a different standard of protection (and does not simply 
codify the BIT standard). The remainder of section 6 then provides certain colour to this right and 
includes an investor’s right to receive written reasons for administrative decisions, access to 
government held information in a timely fashion, and to have disputes heard in a fair public hearing 
(all of which can be achieved through reliance on generally applicable legislation, such as the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act and the Promotion of Access to Information Act). It appears 
that this provision reflects the dictates of procedural fairness, but may fall short of the standard of fair 
and equitable treatment enshrined in BITs. On the other hand, this particular wording may simply 
represent an attempt to interpret the ‘fair and equitable’ standard of treatment traditionally found in 
BITs. Whether the POI Act actually represents a different level of fair and equitable treatment as the 
BITs will only be determined through the creation of jurisprudence on this point. The POI Act does 
not succeed in codifying or clarifying the BIT standard of fair and equitable treatment, and instead 
includes distinct wording that creates further uncertainties. 
Section 8 sets out a national treatment obligation for foreign investors. However, unlike the 
equivalent BIT provision, this standard of treatment is not open-ended, but applies only to foreign 
investors in ‘like circumstances’ as South African investors. A non-exhaustive list of like 
circumstances is then enumerated, together with a set of exclusions as to when national treatment will 
not apply. Included in this set of exclusions from national treatment are affirmative action measures in 
favour of historically disadvantaged South Africans. The POI Act contains both a limitation on the 
scope of the national treatment standards (the requirement for like circumstances), together with 
explicit exemptions to cater for South Africa’s unique circumstances. This clause appears to have 
been drafted to cater for the specific claims arising from the Foresti arbitration, and explored in the 
DTI BIT policy review. 
Section 12 enshrines the right to regulate in the public interest, which was absent from most 
of the BITs concluded by South Africa, and certainly from the two BITs under investigation in the 
Foresti arbitration. This section enshrines the right to take measures, in accordance with the 
Constitution and applicable legislation, to (amongst other things) redress historical, social and 
economic inequalities, promote and preserve cultural heritage and practices, achieve progressive 
realization of socio-economic rights and protect the environment. The inclusion of section 12 in the 
POI Act responds to one of the main elements of dispute in the Foresti case, and upholds the 
sovereign right to regulate in the public interest, even where this may have a negative impact on 
investments  and notwithstanding any of the protections contained in the POI Act. 
Section 13 sets out the dispute resolution mechanisms authorized in the POI Act. First, investors 
may have recourse to mediation upon request within 6 months of becoming aware of a dispute 
relating to any action taken by government (section 13(1)). The mediation is to be facilitated by the 
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DTI, which is to maintain a list ‘of qualified mediators of high moral character and recognized 
competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance.’ Section 13(2) provides that an 
investor, upon becoming aware of a dispute as referred to in 13(1) may approach any competent South 
African court, independent tribunal or statutory body for dispute resolution. Investors may only have 
recourse to international arbitration after the exhaustion of domestic remedies and with government 
consent. Should these requirements be satisfied, then the arbitration is to be conducted between South 
Africa and the home state of the applicable investor. 
Upon a plain reading of section 13, clarity is required on a number of aspects, including: 
- What is the status of the mediation set out in section 13(1), and will agreements reached be 
considered binding?; 
- Why has a 6 month time period been placed on a request for mediation? Surely it is always 
preferable that disputes be settled out of court where possible and as such limiting the time in 
which mediation may be requested frustrates this, and effectively forces disputing parties into 
court once the 6 month period has lapsed; 
- Why is human rights expertise not specifically mentioned as a relevant consideration in the 
appointment of mediators, which may mitigate against an unbalanced consideration of only 
narrow commercial interests (which was one of the limitations highlighted in the  
appointment of international arbitrators under the  BIT regime)?  
- Why are the section 13 causes of action limited to ‘action taken by the government, which 
action affected an investment’ – does ‘action’ include government omissions? 
- Does the 6 month time limit apply to the initiation of proceedings in court? This would 
amount to an unacceptable and unlawful inroads on principles of prescription; 
- Are there any standards of conduct applicable to government when refusing a request for 
international arbitration? Should government act reasonably or is there a measure of 
deference to be applied here? For example, should government be forced into an expensive 
international arbitration where an investor requests, even where government has presumably 
succeeded in domestic courts (failing which it is difficult to understand the rationale for the 
investor’s request for arbitration). Alternatively, if the fear is that domestic courts will be 
biased towards government (which was the raison d’etre for international arbitration under 
BITs), should foreign investors be bound to accept government’s decision to avoid 
international arbitration? The possibility of international arbitration by consent only after 
exhaustion of local remedies adds an element of inherent bias – why would a successful party 
to litigation agree to an uncertain(and costly) result under arbitration after already succeeding 
at a local level? This ability to block international arbitration will undoubtedly cause concern 
for foreign investors. 
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- Should international arbitration be agreed, will the international arbitrators be bound to 
adjudicate in terms of the POI Act? Alternatively, what will the cause of action be in the 
absence of a BIT? 
- What is the legal basis for arbitration to be conducted between South Africa and the investor’s 
home state? In the absence of a BIT to which a home state as contracted, it is unclear what the 
jurisdiction of the home state will be in this instance.  
On a plain reading of section 13, there are a number of questions that arise as to interpretation (a 
few of which the author has set out above) and also legal basis for the creation of jurisdiction for the 
home state. Even if these considerations were not in issue, the sheer amount of uncertainty created 
through lax drafting of this clause introduces the possibility of litigation, and also fails to satisfy the 
aim of creating legal certainty.  
Section 15 sets out the transitional provisions, and includes an important ‘savings’ provision 
(which was omitted from previous versions of the POI Bill). In terms of this section, all existing 
investments that were made under BITs continue to be protected in terms of the sunset clauses 
contained in those BITs. Any investments made after termination of BITs but before the POI Act will 
be governed by South Africa law. The import of section 15 appears to be that three distinct regimes 
are created in respect of foreign investment protection:  
1. Investments made before the cancellation or expiry of a relevant BIT will continue to be 
protected for the duration of the sunset clause, in terms of that  BIT; 
2. investments made after cancellation or expiry of the BIT but before the promulgation of 
the POI Act, will be protected in terms of general South African law; and 
3. Investments made after the promulgation of the POI Act will be subject to the provisions 
contained in that Act. 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The author now turns to investigate the central question of this dissertation – whether the POI Act 
represents a viable alternative to BITs in South Africa, through satisfying each perceived limitation in 
BITs. In this chapter, the focus will be on the impact of some of the legislative provisions referenced 
above.  
II. NATURE OF LEGAL INSTRUMENT  
Before any analysis of whether the terms of the POI Act could satisfy the limitations in BITs 
highlighted in the DTI BIT Policy Framework review, it is worth making a few preliminary 
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observations in respect of the instrument selected to rectify the perceived limitations in the BITs, 
being local South African legislation, the POI Act. First and foremost, it is worth noting that none of 
the recommendations made through the DTI BIT Policy Review indicated that local legislation (to the 
exclusion of BITs) might be the most appropriate instrument through which to address the 
shortcomings highlighted through the review. Instead the review concluded with a number of policy 
options for South Africa, amongst others, a review of commitments under existing BITs, allowing 
existing BITs to lapse and then reassessing South Africa’s position in respect of the form and content 
of BITs, developing a Model BIT to address the perceived substantive issues and possibly domestic 
legislative intervention. It therefore appears that the DTI did not contemplate that domestic legislation 
alone could solve the issues that arose through the BIT review. Although DTI policy statements made 
do indicate that a Model BIT is in the process of being drafted, the POI Act does not directly 
reference nor incorporate any such Model BIT. As at the date of this thesis, the POI Act is the only 
instrument governing foreign investment directly (of course, there may be generally applicable laws, 
as well as BITs in existence through the application of sunset clauses), and the POI Act must be 
reviewed in this light. Of course, this is not per se a failing, and would not be if the POI Act could 
factually meet the requirements set out in the DTI BIT policy review. The rest of this chapter will be 
dedicated to determining whether this is, or could reasonably be, the case. 
One significant drawback of the approach of protecting foreign direct investment through 
local legislation alone is the removal of a contractual nexus with a home State, which has a number of 
implications. One such implication is the lack of reciprocity by a BIT contracting party – by 
cancelling all BITs and refusing to re-negotiate them, South African investors investing in that 
contracting jurisdiction and who previously enjoyed reciprocal investment protection under a BIT, 
will lose this protection for their investments in that contracting party, and may be subject to different 
levels of investment protection (if at all). This means that many South African investors who are 
capital exporting are placed in an analogous position as was the case pre BITs, and are faced with the 
realities of investing into a jurisdiction without legal certainty as to their rights and the standards of 
treatment they will enjoy in that host state. This appears to conflict with the DTI BIT Policy Review, 
which explicitly recognized in its conclusion and recommendations that BITs might be unavoidable, 
given the demands of South Africa’s ‘own business community who seek protection for their outward-
bound investments’.
111
 The cancellation of BITs has effectively eradicated these protections, and the 
POI Act cannot re-instate such protection. South African capital exporting investors (in the absence of 
any other preferential treatment through regional or other arrangements) are worse off as a result of 
the cancellation of BITs and replacement with national legislation. 
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Another point worth noting is that the choice of investment protection instrument might 
actually erode investor confidence, thereby having an undesired and unintended negative 
consequence. This is because, unlike the BITs which would be subject to negotiation and mutual 
agreement to amend, the POI Act is a unilateral legislative instrument, which can be revoked or 
amended at the instance of South Africa alone, thereby significantly damaging investor confidence in 
the regime itself (and almost negating any substantive consideration of its merits, which may be 
altered at will). Further, the move away from negotiation and towards unilateral regulation may be 
perceived negatively by the international community, and may contribute to the growing unease with 
the South African business environment that some trading partners have voiced. 
III. NOTABLE OMISSIONS  
Before embarking on a discussion on the substantive provisions of the POI Act, it will be worthwhile 
to highlight some notable omissions. 
The preamble of the POI Act asserts that one of its aims is to secure ‘a balance of rights and 
obligations of investors’. However, upon review of the Act, substantive obligations for foreign 
investors are conspicuously absent. In fact, other than section 7s requirement that investments be 
established in compliance with South African law, there are no substantive obligations placed on 
investors.  No performance requirements are placed on investors, nor are any standards of conduct 
required from investors (these are two matters specifically referenced in the DTI Policy review). 
According to the DTI, ‘an investment agreement that does not address investor obligations is 
manifestly incomplete’
112
, and the absence of any investor obligations from the POI Act could 
represent a missed opportunity. The POI Act, much like the BIT regime that came before it, only 
places obligations on the host state (South Africa), and entitles investors to certain standards of 
treatment from South Africa – fair administrative treatment (section 6) and national treatment for 
foreign investors in like circumstances with South African investors (section  8). Whilst granted there 
are limitations placed on these standards of treatment (as set out above), which differs from the 
situation under many BITs, these limitations cannot substitute for positive obligations on the part of 
investors. The standards of conduct required under the POI Act unfortunately remain one-sided in 
favour of investors, just as their BIT predecessor did. 
The POI Act does not specifically reference nor incorporate the BIT protections against 
unlawful expropriation nor the payment of ‘prompt adequate and effective compensation’, but instead 
accords all investors the right to property as enshrined in the Constitution. The BIT protection against 
unlawful expropriation and compensation requirements were an essential element in dispute in the 
Foresti case and subsequent DTI review. The DTI review highlighted the clear tension between the 
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supreme law of South Africa, being the Constitution, and the BITs – both in respect of the scope of 
government acts that may amount to expropriation (with the Constitution recognising a distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation, whilst the BITs did not) and the requirements of 
compensation (which may be less than market-value under the Constitution, but not BITs requiring 
‘full’ or ‘effective’ compensation to be paid). Through expressly incorporating section 25 of the 
Constitution, the POI eliminates the potential for future disputes in respect of differences in 
interpretation in respect of expropriation provisions of the Constitution and BITs, and ensures that the 
Constitutional standards will apply to all investors.  
Another notable omission from the POI Act is the absence of most-favoured nation treatment, 
which was a regular feature of BITs. As mentioned above, this is a relative standard of treatment 
which ensures that each investor, regardless of their home state, was treated as ‘most favoured’ in 
relation to protection of investment in the host state. The POI Act incorporates only national treatment 
standards, but not their usual accompaniment, most-favoured nation treatment. The impact of this 
could be that, should later BITs be concluded based on South Africa’s Model BIT, then those 
investors will potentially be treated more favourably than investors (either South African or foreign) 
governed only by the POI Act. Whilst this is understandable from a South African policy perspective 
(where BITs are an exception, and may be entered into based on special relationships between 
contracting parties and accepted reciprocal favourable treatment), it is likely to cause unhappiness for 
foreign investors, who will have to accept that their investment could receive less favourable 
treatment in relation to the investments of other foreign investors, and they would be unable to claim 
that same favourable treatment through invoking a most-favoured nation clause. 
IV. DRAFTING SUCCESSES 
Based on the specific provisions of the POI Act referenced in the preceding Chapter, the POI Act 
is successful in satisfying some of the concerns raised in respect of BITs in the DTI BIT review. In 
particular, the POI Act has succeeded in: 
 Including reference to aims broader that simply investment protection in its preamble, thereby 
providing crucial context, which was often lacking in BITs; 
 Enshrining South Africa’s sovereign right to regulate at section 12, which right was often 
curtailed in BITs; 
 Including an obligation to exhaust local remedies before recourse may be had to international 
arbitration. Various authors have expressed concerns that international arbitration may not be 
the most appropriate forum to adjudicate foreign investment disputes, for a host of reasons 
including: lack of transparency, no system of precedent, limited (if any) consideration of 
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objectives broader than investment protection and prohibitive costs for developing countries. 
These factors were also raised in the  DTI BIT review; 
 Limiting the application of national treatment to the situation where local and foreign 
investors are in ‘like circumstances’ and further legislating exceptions to national treatment 
standards; 
 Incorporating the constitutional protection against expropriation and related jurisprudence 
through section 10, ensuring that a single standard applies to local and foreign investors; 
The POI Act has (at least on paper) succeeded in rectifying a number of perceived BIT 
limitations. Unfortunately, for all of the gains made through the POI Act, the author considers that the 
POI Act is fatally flawed in a significant respect. 
V. POI FLAWS 
The POI Act was drafted in response to the limitations in the BIT framework, which were first 
(and very publicly) exposed through the Foresti arbitration, and eventually formed the basis of the 
DTI BIT review. The Foresti arbitration exposed the manner in which South Africa’s BITs could be 
used by disgruntled investors to challenge legitimate government policy, a topic which South Africa 
considered serious enough to mandate a task team to investigate it. This task team then spent almost 
four years
113
 investigating South Africa’s BIT macro and micro policies, and developed a detailed 
position paper in response to the limitations highlighted in the review and recommending policy 
responses to these limitations. The review findings highlighted numerous flaws in South Africa’s 
historically negotiated BITs (from South Africa’s perspective), which opened the door for further 
litigation against South Africa, and particularly against its affirmative action policies. The POI Act 
was drafted as a replacement to these BITs.  
The BIT savings provisions contained in transitional provisions of the POI Act, which allow an 
investor to have recourse to BITs where an agreed sunset period has not expired, repudiate the very 
existence of the POI Act. As you will see from Table A above, some of these sunset clauses extend to 
20 years! This means that investors from ex-contracting parties may continue to challenge South 
African government policy (including affirmative action policies) for 20 years from South Africa’s 
termination of the BIT in question. The POI Act effectively crystallized an unsatisfactory position 
under the BITs. Further, there is an argument to be made that, based on the most-favoured nation 
provisions contained in the BITs (and surviving through the applicable sunset clauses), investors will 
be entitled to rely on the longest sunset period. Once again, referring to Table A, this theoretically 
could mean that the 10 year sunset provision in the Danish, Greek, Chinese, Iranian and Nigerian 
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BITs could be extended to 20 years through reliance on the most-favoured nation provision, and 
considering the more favourable 20 year sunset provision in the United Kingdom or German BIT (for 
example). This is obviously an untenable situation. 
Aside from this fatal flaw, the POI Act fails in the following material respects: 
 The POI Act does not create legal certainty. Instead, it enshrines recourse to 3 different 
governing laws, depending on when an investment was made – all investments made under 
BITs continue to be protected under the terms of that BIT for the duration of the sunset 
clause, all investments made after the termination of BITs but before promulgation of the POI 
are governed by general South African law, and all investments made after the promulgation 
of the POI Act will be governed by that Act; 
 The POI Act does not place any substantive obligations on investors, contrary to the 
statements made in the DTI BIT review; 
 The loss of reciprocity, through the unilateral termination of BITs and replacement with 
national legislation, will likely be problematic for investment protection of South African 
citizens investing abroad.  
 The POI Act does not set out an overarching investment policy for South Africa and there is 
arguably still a ‘patchwork of considerations’ that apply, this time based on the date at which 
the investment was made (which determines the law that will apply). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis was to examine whether South Africa’s POI Act represented a viable alternative 
to BITs for the protection of foreign investment. To do this, the author examined the criticisms 
leveled at BITs, and undertook to investigate whether the POI Act addressed and rectified these 
criticisms in a satisfactory manner, through a review of the provisions of the POI Act. 
In the introductory chapter the scene was set for the problem under investigation. Chapter 2 
briefly explored the history of BITs worldwide, and in particular the reasons for their conclusion and 
development. Here the author also touched on South Africa’s history of negotiating BITs. Chapter 3 
then delved into more depth on South Africa’s BITs and their typical provisions, culminating in a 
review of a number of standard (problematic) clauses across South Africa’s BITs. Chapter 3 focused 
on the standard provisions across South Africa’s BITs, and Chapter 4 then underscored the impact of 
these provisions, which came to the fore in the Foresti arbitration. Chapter 4 detailed the arbitral 
claims of the Foresti Claimants, which centered on South Africa’s alleged breach of two BITs, as well 
as South Africa’s response to these claims. The purpose of Chapter 4 was to highlight through a 
practical example, how BITs may encroach on legitimate policy space in the sphere of human rights. 
In the Foresti example, the provisions of two historically negotiated BITs were used to challenge 
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South Africa’s affirmative action policies, which were drafted in response to the inequalities created 
by the deplorable apartheid construct. Chapter 5 focused on the fallout from Foresti, and South 
Africa’s policy responses to the realization that historical BITs could be used to block legitimate 
affirmative action measures in the public interest. These policy responses were contained in the DTI 
BIT Policy Review Framework, and Chapter 5 summarised the DTI’s recommendations in respect of 
South Africa’s macro and micro BIT policy. Chapter 5 provides the necessary context for the 
development of the POI Act in South Africa, and sets the benchmark for comparison against the POI 
Act, through highlighting the perceived BIT limitations. The purpose of Chapter 6 is to review the 
substantive provisions of the POI Act, together with an analysis of whether the POI Act satisfies the 
limitations highlighted in the DTI BIT policy framework. Chapter 7 discusses the apparent successes 
and failures of the POI Act, in satisfying its own aims as well as the DT BIT review findings.  
Based on the DTIs findings in its review compared against the substantive provisions 
contained in the POI Act, and particularly the fatal flaw which effectively crystallises the BIT 
framework with all its apparent imperfections, the author does not believe that the POI Act represents 
a viable alternative to BITs. Although the POI Act does succeed on some aspects highlighted in the 
DTI BIT review – including a limitation of recourse to international arbitration and national treatment 
for foreigners – the successes of the POI Act are unfortunately outnumbered by its flaws. 
Unfortunately, through South Africa’s refusal to enter into BIT negotiations prior to termination, they 
have thrown the metaphorical baby out with the bathwater. South Africa has somehow, through the 
POI Act, succeeded in possibly alienating its trading partners and definitely offending them, without 
actually improving its position under the BITs, which continue in existence. Had South Africa entered 
into BIT negotiations, there may have been the possibility that a better deal was agreed, as opposed to 
being bound by a bad deal for the duration of a sunset provision. Just as the newly democratic South 
Africa was too zealous to enter into BITs, so too were they over-zealous in exiting them. In both 
instances, to the detriment of South Africa which continues to be bound by historical badly drafted 
BITs. A better alternative would have been renegotiating historical BITs based on a Model BIT, 
which addressed the limitations highlighted in the DTI BIT review and which was based on a 
coherent BIT policy. This would have also succeeded in preserving BIT protections for South African 
nationals investing abroad. With the amount of controversy it has created, South Africa could have 
actually gone further to correct a biased framework, but instead, it has crystallised the unfavorable 
position for at least the duration of the sunset clauses and created fragmented legal regimes (thus 
opening itself up to constitutional scrutiny for schizophrenic treatment of investors across different 
regimes). The POI Act represents a missed opportunity for South Africa to develop a holistic 
investment protection policy based on reciprocity, and therefore fails as a viable investment protection 
alternative to BITs.   
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Provisions  relating to United Kingdom Germany Netherlands Sweden Czech Republic 
Signature date 20-Sep-94 11-Sep-95 09-May-95 25-May-98 14-Dec-98 
Application to 
investments made 
before entry into of 
BIT 
Investment includes all 
investments, whether made before 
or after entry into of BIT.  
Applies to investments made prior 
to entry into force of the treaty, as 
well as during the course of the 
BIT.  
Applies to investments made from 
and before the date of the treaty. 
Applies to all investments, whether 
made before or after entry into force 
of the BIT.  
 
Each Contracting Party shall apply 
to investments made in its territory 
by investors of the other 
Contracting Party treatment which 
is no less favourable than that 
accorded to investments made by its 
own investors or by investors of 
third States, whichever is the more 
favourable 
BIT applies to future investments 
made by investors, of one Party in 
the territory of the other Party, and 
also to the investments existing at 
the date the BIT is entered into.  
Fair  and equitable 
treatment 
Investments of nationals or 
companies of each contracting party 
shall at all times be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection and security in 
the territory of the other contracting 
party.  
 
Neither contracting party shall in 
any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the 
management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of 
investments in its territory of 
nationals or companies of the other 
contracting party.  
Investments must be accorded fair 
and equitable treatment. 
 
Neither contracting party shall in 
any way impair by arbitrary or 
discriminatory measures the 
management, maintenance, use or 
enjoyment of investments in its 
territory of nationals or companies 
of the other contracting party.  
Each Contracting Party shall ensure 
fair and equitable treatment of the 
investments of investors of the 
other Contracting Party and shall 
not impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, the 
operation, management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those investors.  
 
Each Contracting Party shall accord 
to such investments full physical 
security and protection. 
Each Contracting Party shall at all 
times ensure fair and equitable 
treatment of the investments by 
investors of the other Contracting 
Party and shall not impair the 
management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal thereof as 
well as the acquisition of goods and 
services and the sale of their 
production, through unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures. 
Investments of investors of either 
Party shall at all times be accorded 
fair and equitable treatment and 
shall enjoy full protection and 
security in the territory of the other 
Party. 
 
Each Party shall in its territory 
accord to investors of the other 
Party, as regards management 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of their investment, 
treatment which is fair and equitable 
and not less favourable than that 
which it accords to its own investors 






Neither contracting party shall in its 
territory subject investments or 
returns of nationals or companies of 
the other Contracting Party to 
treatment less favourable than that 
which it accords to investments or 
returns of its own nationals or 
companies or to investments or 
returns of nationals or companies of 
any third state. 
 
Neither contracting party shall in its 
territory subject nationals or 
companies of the other contracting 
party, as regards their management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of their investments, to 
treatment less favourable than that 
which it accords to its own 
nationals or companies or to 
nationals or companies of any third 
state. 
Neither contracting party shall 
subject investments (or nationals or 
companies as regards their 
investment activities) in its 
territory owned by nationals or 
companies of the other contracting 
party to treatment less favourable 
than it accords to investments of its 
own nationals or companies or to 
investments of nationals or 
companies of any third state.  
Each Contracting Party shall accord 
to investments treatment which in 
any case shall not be less 
favourable than that which it 
accords to investments of its own 
investors or to investments of 
investors of any third State, 
whichever is more favourable to the 
investor concerned. 
Each Contracting Party shall apply 
to investments made in its territory 
by 
investors of the other Contracting 
Party treatment which is no less 
favourable than that accorded to 
investments made by its own 
investors or by investors of third 
States, whichever is the more 
favourable.  
Each Party shall in its territory 
accord to investments and returns of 
investors of the other Party 
treatment which is fair and equitable 
and not less favourable than that 
which it accords to investments and 
returns of its own investors or to 
investments and returns of investors 







Investments of nationals or 
companies of either contracting 
party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to 
measures having effect equivalent 
to nationalisation or expropriation, 
in the territory of the other 
contracting party except for a 
public purpose related to the 
internal needs of that party on a 
non-discriminatory basis and 
against prompt adequate and 
effective compensation.  
Investments shall not be 
expropriated, nationalised or 
subjected to any other measure the 
effects of which would be 
tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalisation in the territory of 
the other contracting party except 
for in the public interest and 
against compensation.  
 
Compensation must be equivalent 
to the value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the 
date on which the actual or 
threatened expropriation, 
nationalisation or comparable 
measure has become publicly 
known.  
 
Compensation shall be paid 
without delay and shall carry the 
normal commercial interest until 
the time of payment, and shall be 
effectively realisable and freely 
transferable. Legality of 
expropriation and compensation 
subject to review by due process of 
law. 
Neither Contracting Party shall take 
any measures depriving, directly or 
indirectly, investors of the other 
Contracting Party of their 
investments unless the following 
conditions 
are complied with:  
 
(a) the measures are taken in the 
public interest and under due 
process of law;  
(b) the measures are not 
discriminatory or contrary to any 
undertaking which the 
Contracting Party which takes such 
measures may have given;  
(c) the measures are taken against 
just compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall represent 
the genuine value of the 
investments affected, shall include 
interest at a normal commercial rate 
until the date of payment and shall, 
in order to be effective for the 
claimants, be paid and made 
transferable, without delay, to the 
country designated by 
the claimants concerned and in the 
currency of the country of which 
the claimants are nationals or in any 
freely convertible currency 
accepted by the claimants. 
Neither Contracting Party shall take 
any measures depriving, directly or 
indirectly, an investor of the other 
Contracting Party of an investment 
unless the following conditions are 
complied with: 
 
(a) the measures are taken in the 
public interest and under due 
process 
of law; 
(b) the measures are distinct and not 
discriminatory; and 
(c) the measures are accompanied 
by provisions for the payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation, which shall be 
transferable without delay in a 
freely convertible currency. 
Investments of investors of either 
Party shall not be nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to 
measures having effect equivalent 
to nationalisation or expropriation, , 
in the territory of the other Party 
except for a public purpose.  
 
The expropriation shall be carried 
out under due process of law, on a 
non-discriminatory basis and shall 
be accompanied by provisions for 
the payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall at least be 
equal to the value of the investment 
expropriated immediately before the 
expropriation or impending 
expropriation became public 
knowledge, shall include interest at 
a normal commercial rate from the 
date of expropriation, shall be made 
without undue delay, be effectively 
realisable and be freely transferable 
in freely convertible currency. 
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Exceptions Most favoured nation and national 
treatment provisions do not apply in 
relation to existing or future 
customs union or similar 
international agreement; or an 
arrangement relating to taxation.  
Most favoured nation and national 
treatment provisions do not apply 
to advantages as a result of 
customs or economic union, a 
common market or a free trade 
area; or advantages under a double 
tax treaty.  
Most favoured nation and national 
treatment provisions do not apply to 
advantages as a result of customs 
unions, economic unions, monetary 
unions, free trade areas, common 
markets or similar institutions, or 
on the basis of interim agreements 
leading to these; double taxation 
arrangements.  
Most favoured nation and national 
treatment provisions do not apply to 
advantages as a result of a customs 
union, a common market or a free 
trade area. 
Most favoured nation and national 
treatment provisions do not apply to 
advantages as a result of a customs 
union, a common market or a free 
trade area, taxation arrangements. 
 
A further exception relates to any 
law or other measure the purpose 
of which is to promote the 
achievement of equality in its 
territory, or designed to protect 
or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, previously 




Disputes to be submitted to 
international arbitration - either to 
the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID); the Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of 
Commerce; or an international 
arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal to be appointed by special 
agreement or established  under the 
arbitration rules of the United 
Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law.  
Disputes to be submitted to 
international arbitration. To be 
submitted for arbitration under the 
Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other states 
or under the Additional Facility for 
the administration of proceedings 
by the secretariat of the 
International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes.  
Disputes submitted to be 
international arbitration, either 
ICSID, the Court of Arbitration of 
the International Chamber of 
Commerce, or an international 
arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal to be appointed by a special 
agreement or established under the 
Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
Disputes submitted to ICSID or 
either to the Additional Facility of 
ICSID or to an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal to be set up under the 
Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on 
International Trade law 
(UNCITRAL). 
Disputes may be submitted to 
competent courts or administrative 
tribunals of the parties, ICSID or the 
Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by 
the Secretariat of ICSID or an 
arbitrator or international ad hoc 
arbitral tribunal established under 
the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).  
Sunset clause In respect  of investments made 
whilst the agreement is in force, its 
provisions shall continue in effect 
with respect to such investment for 
a period of 20 years after the 
termination 
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 20 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 15 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, remains in 
force for a period of 20 years from 
termination date.  
In respect of investments made prior 
to termination, continues in effect 







Provisions  relating to Denmark Finland Greece Korea China 
Signature date 22-Feb-96 Dated 1998 19-Nov-98 07-Jul-95 30-Dec-97 
Application to 
investments made before 
entry into of BIT 
Applies to investments made by 
investors of one Contracting 
Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party prior to or after 
the entry into force of the 
Agreement.  
Applies to all investments, 
whether made before or after 
entry into force of the BIT.  
BIT also applies to existing 
investments made prior to its entry 
into force by investors.  
Applies to all investments 
whether made before or after 
entry into force of the BIT. 
BIT applies to investments which 
are made prior to or after its entry 
into force.  
Fair  and equitable 
treatment 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord to investments 
made by investors of the other 
Contracting Party fair and 
equitable treatment which in no 
case shall be less favourable than 
that accorded to its own investors 
or to investors of any third state, 
whichever is the more favourable 
from the point of view of 
the investor. 
 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord investors of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards 
their management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investment, fair and equitable 
treatment which in no case shall be 
less favourable than that accorded 
to its own investors or to investors 
of any third State, whichever of 
these standards is the more 
favourable from the point of view 
of the investor. 
Investments by investors of one 
Contracting Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection and security 
in the territory of the host Party.  
 
The host Party shall in no way in 
its territory, by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures, impair 
the management, maintenance, 
use,  
enjoyment or disposal of 
investments by investors of the 
other Contracting Party. 
Investments by investors of a 
Contracting Party shall, at all 
times be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall enjoy 
full protection and security in the 
territory of the other Contracting 
Party.  
 
Each Contracting Party shall 
ensure that the management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal, in its territory, of 
investments by investors of the 
other Contracting Party, is not in 
any way impaired by unjustifiable 
or discriminatory measures. 
Investments of investors of either 
Contracting Party shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment and shall enjoy full 
protection and security in the 
territory of the other Contracting 
Party.  
 
Neither Contracting Party shall in 
any way impair by unreasonable 
or discriminatory measures the 
management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of 
investments in its territory of 
investors of the other Contracting 
Party 
Investments and activities 
associated with investments of 
investors of either Contracting 
Party shall be accorded fair and 
equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy protection in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party.  
 
Neither Contracting Party shall in 
any way impair by unreasonable 
or discriminatory measures the 
management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of 
investments in its territory of 






and national treatment 
provisions 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord to investments 
made by investors of the other 
Contracting Party fair and 
equitable treatment which in no 
case shall be less favourable than 
that accorded to its own investors 
or to investors of any third state, 
whichever is the more favourable 
from the point of view of 
the investor. 
 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord investors of the 
other Contracting Party, as regards 
their management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investment, fair and equitable 
treatment which in no case shall be 
less favourable than that accorded 
to its own investors or to investors 
of any third State, whichever of 
these standards is the more 
favourable from the point of view 
of the investor. 
The host Party shall in its territory 
subject investments by investors 
of the other Contracting Party to 
treatment no less favourable than 
that which it accords to 
investments of its own investors 
or to investments of investors of 
any third State.  
 
The host Party shall in its territory 
subject investors of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards the 
management, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of their investments, to 
treatment no less favourable than 
that which it accords to its own 
investors or to investors of any 
third State. 
Each Contracting Party shall 
accord to investments, made in its 
territory by investors of the other 
Contracting Party, treatment not 
less favourable than that which it 
accords to investments of its own 
investors or to investments of 
investors of any third State, 
whichever is more favourable. 
 
Each Contracting Party shall 
accord to investors of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards their 
activity in connection with 
investments in its territory, 
treatment not less 
favourable than that which it 
accords to its own investors or to 
investors of any third State, 
whichever is more favourable. 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord to investments 
and returns of investors of the 
other Contracting Party treatment 
not less favourable than that 
which it accords to investments 
and returns of its own investors or 
of investors of any third State.  
 
Each Contracting Party shall in its 
territory accord to investors of the 
other Contracting Party as regards 
management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment of disposal of their 
investment not less favourable 
than that which it accords to its 
own investors or to the investors 
of any third State. 
The treatment and protection 
referred in this BIT shall not be 
less favourable than that accorded 
to investments and activities 
associated with such investments 
of investors of a third State.  
 
Without prejudice to its laws and 
regulations, each Contracting 
Party shall accord to investments 
and activities associated with 
such investments by the investors 
of the other Contracting Party 
treatment 
not less favourable than that 
accorded to the investments and 








Investments of investors of each 
Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized, expropriated or 
subjected to measures having 
effect equivalent to nationalisation 
or expropriation (hereinafter 
referred to as "expropriation") in 
the territory of the other 
Contracting Party except for 
expropriations 
made in the public interest, on a 
basis 
of non-discrimination, carried out 
under due process of law, and 
against prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall amount 
to the fair market value of the 
investment expropriated 
immediately 
before the expropriation or 
impending expropriation became 
known in such a way as to affect 
the value of the investment. 
Investments by investors of one 
Contracting Party in the territory 
of the host Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or 
subjected to measures having the 
same effect except in the public 
interest on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 
 
The measures shall be carried out 
under due process of law and 
shall be accompanied by prompt, 
adequate and effective 
compensation. 
 
Such compensation shall amount 
to the fair market value of the 
investment expropriated at the 
time immediately before the 
expropriation or impending 
expropriation became public 
knowledge in such a way as to 
affect the value of the investment. 
Investments by investors of either 
Contracting Party in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party, 
shall not be expropriated, 
nationalized or subjected to any 
other measure the effects of which 
would be tantamount to 
expropriation or nationalization, 
except in the public interest, under 
due process of law, on a non-
discriminatory basis and against 
payment of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. 
 
Such compensation shall amount 
to the market value of the 
investment affected immediately 
before the actual measure was 
taken or became public 
knowledge, whichever is the 
earlier, it shall include interest 
from the date of expropriation 
until the date of payment at a 
normal commercial rate and shall 
be freely transferable in a freely 
convertible currency. 
Investments of investors of either 
Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized, expropriated or 
subjected to measures having 
effect equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation in 
the territory of the other 
Contracting Party except for a 
public purpose, under due process 
of law, on a non-discriminatory 
basis and provided that it is 
accompanied by prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall amount 
to the market value of the 
investment expropriated 
immediately before the 
expropriatory action was taken or 
impending expropriation became 
public knowledge, whichever is 
the earlier, shall include interest 
from the date of expropriation at a 
normal commercial rate and shall 
be made without undue delay, be 
effectively realizable and be 
freely transferable.  
 
The investor of one Contracting 
Party claiming that all or part of 
his or its investment has been 
expropriated shall have a right to 
prompt review by a judicial or 
other independent authority of the 
other Contracting Party, of his or 
its case and of the valuation of his 
or its investment in accordance 
with the principles relating to 
prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. 
Investments of investors of either 
Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalized expropriated, or 
subjected to measures having 
effects equivalent to 
nationalization or expropriation 
in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party except for 
public purposes, under domestic 
legal procedure, on a non-
discriminatory basis and against 
compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall be at 
least equal to the market value of 
the investment expropriated 
immediately before the 
expropriation or before the 
impending 
expropriation became public 
knowledge, whichever is the 
earlier, shall include interest at a 
normal commercial rate until the 
date of payment, shall be made 




Exceptions Does not apply to advantages as a 
result of development finance 
institutions, in terms of regional 
economic integration, customs 
union or taxation agreements.  
Provisions do not apply to 
advantages as a result of regional 
economic organisation or customs 
union, taxation agreements, 
development finance institutions.  
Provisions do not apply to 
advantages as a result of customs 
union, regional economic 
integration, economic union, 
taxation agreements, or 
development finance institutions.  
Provisions do not apply to 
benefits as a result of existing or 
future customs union, free trade 
area, common external tariff area, 
monetary union or similar, 
development finance institutions, 
taxation agreements. 
Provisions not apply to benefits 
arising from customs union, free 
trade area, common market and 
any similar or interim agreement, 
frontier trade agreement, taxation 
arrangement or development 
finance assistance.  
Investor/state dispute 
settlement 
Disputes may be submitted to 
international arbitration by the 
International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes established 
pursuant to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals 
of other States, the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-
finding Proceedings; or an 
international ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal 
established under the Arbitration 
Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International 
Trade Law. 
Disputes may be submitted to the 
International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), 
established pursuant to the 
Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other 
States, opened for signature at 
Washington on 18 March 1965; 
or to an ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal, which unless otherwise 
agreed upon by the parties to the 
dispute, is to be established under 
the Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of 
Proceedings by the Secretariat of 
ICSID. 
May submit dispute either to 
Competent courts of the 
contracting party in the territory of 
which the investment has been 
made or to international 
arbitration, either the International 
Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes,  
established under the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States. opened 
for signature at Washington D.C. 
on 18 March 1965. when each 
Contracting Party has become a 
party to said Convention, under 
the rules governing the Additional 
Facility for the Administration of 
Proceedings by the Secretariat of 
ICSID; or an ad hoc arbitral 
tribunal to be established under the 
arbitration rules of the 
United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law 
(U.N.C.I.T.R.A.L.) or any other 
international arbitration or an ad 
hoc arbitration tribunal as agreed 
between the parties to the dispute. 
Local remedies under the laws 
and regulations of the Contracting 
Party in whose territory the 
investment is made are available. 
 
If the dispute cannot be settled in 
6 months: it shall be submitted 
upon request of either the investor 
or the Contracting Party to either;  
the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), established pursuant to 
the Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other 
States, opened for signature in 
Washing D.C. on 18 March 1965; 
or an ad hoc arbitral tribunal 
which, unless otherwise agreed 
upon by the parties to the dispute, 
shall be established under the 
arbitration rules of the United 
Nations Commission on 
International Trade 
Law(UNCITRAL), the dispute 
may be settled under the rules 
governing the Additional Facility 
for the Administration of 
Proceedings by the Secretariat of 
the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment 
Disputes. 
If the dispute cannot the settled 
through negotiations within six 
months, either Party to the 
dispute 
shall be entitled to submit the 
dispute to an international arbitral 
tribunal provided that the 
Contracting 
Party involved in the dispute may 
require the investor to initiate 
administrative review procedures 
in 
accordance with its laws and 
regulations, and provided that the 
investor has not submitted the 




Sunset clause In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 10 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 20 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 10 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 20 years.  
In respect of investments made 
prior to termination, continues in 





Provisions  relating to Iran Mauritius Nigeria 
Signature date 03-Nov-97 Undated 29-Apr-00 
Application to 
investments made before 
entry into of BIT 
BIT applies to investments made before or after entry into 
force. 
BIT applies to all investments, whether made before or after the 
entry into force of the BIT. 
BIT applies to all investments, whether made before or after 
the date of entry into force of the BIT. 
Fair  and equitable 
treatment 
Investments and proceeds of investors of either Contracting 
Party effected within the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, shall receive the host Contracting Party's full legal 
protection and fair treatment not less favourable than that 
accorded to its own investors or to investors of any third 
state who are in a comparable situation. 
Investments and returns of investors of either Contracting Party 
shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall 
enjoy full protection in the territory of the other Contracting Party.  
 
Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable 
or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of investors of 
the other Contracting Party. 
 
Investments and returns of investors of either Party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy 
full protection in the territory of the other Party. 
 
 
Neither Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of 
investors of the other Party. 
 
Most-favoured nation 
and national treatment 
provisions 
Investments and proceeds of investors of either Contracting 
Party effected within the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, shall receive the host Contracting Party's full legal 
protection and fair treatment not less favourable than that 
accorded to its own investors or to investors of any third 
state who are in a comparable situation. 
Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investments 
and returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment 
not less favourable than that which it accords to investments and 
returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of 
investors of any third State. 
 
Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to investors of 
the other Contracting Party treatment not less favourable than that 
which it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third 
State. 
Each Party shall in its territory accord to investments and 
returns of investors of the other Party treatment not less 
favourable than that which it accords to investments and 
returns of its own investors or to investments and returns of 
investors of any third 
State. 
 
Each Party shall in its territory accord to investors of the other 
Party treatment not less favourable than that which it accords 







Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall 
not be 
nationalized, confiscated, expropriated or subjected to 
similar measures by the other Contracting Party unless if 
such measures are taken for public purposes, in 
accordance with due process of law, in a non-
discriminatory manner and upon payment of prompt, 
effective and appropriate compensation. 
 
The amount of compensation shall be equivalent to the 
value of the 
investment immediately before the action of 
nationalization, confiscation or expropriation was taken. 
Investments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effects 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation in the territory of the 
other Contracting Party except for public purposes, under due 
process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation. Interest at a normal 
commercial rate shall be paid for undue delay in paying such 
compensation. 
 
The investor affected by the expropriation shall have a right, under 
the law of the Contracting Party making the expropriation, to 
prompt review, by a court of law or other independent and 
impartial forum of that Contracting Party, of the legality of the 
expropriation and of the valuation of his or its investment in 
accordance with the principles of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation. 
Investments of investors of either Party shall not be 
nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having 
effects equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation 
in the territory of the other Party except for public purposes, 
under due process of law, on a non-discriminatory basis and 
against 
payment of prompt, adequate and fair compensation.  
 
Such compensation shall be at 
least equal to the market value of the investment expropriated 
immediately before the expropriation or before the impending 
expropriation became public knowledge, whichever is the 
earlier, shall include interest at a normal commercial rate until 
the 
date of payment, shall be made without delay and shalt be 
effectively realizable. 
 
The investor affected by the expropriation shall have a right, 
under the domestic law of the Party making the expropriation, 
to prompt review, by a court of law or other independent and 
impartial forum of that Party, of his or its case and of the 
valuation of his or its investment in accordance with the 
principles of prompt, adequate and fair compensation. 
Exceptions Provisions do not apply to benefits arising from a free trade 
area, customs union, common market or a similar regional 
institution or taxation arrangements.  
 
The provisions of Article 4 (protection of investments) 
shall not be construed so as to oblige the Republic of 
South Africa to extend to investors of the other 
Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, 
preference or privilege resulting from: 
... Any law or other measure taken, pursuant to Article 
(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (Act 108, 1996) the purpose of which is to promote 
the achievement of equality in its territory, or designed 
to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination. 
Provisions do not apply to benefits arising from existing or future 
customs union, free trade area, common market or similar 
international agreement, arrangements in respect of development 
financial institutions or taxation.  
 
Further, Contracting Parties are not obliged to extend to investors 
of the other Contracting Party the benefit of any treatment, 
preference of privilege resulting form...Any law or measure in 
pursuance of any law, the purpose of which is to promote the 
achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination in its territory. 
Provisions do not apply to benefits arising from existing or 
future customs union, free trade area, common market or 
similar international agreement, arrangements in respect of 
development financial institutions or taxation.  
 
Further, Contracting Parties are not obliged to extend to 
investors of the other Contracting Party the benefit of any 
treatment, preference or privilege resulting form...Any law or 
measure in pursuance of any law, the purpose of which is to 
promote the achievement of equality in its territory, or 
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of 





Disputes to be submitted to arbitration. National courts do 
not have jurisdiction over any dispute referred to 
arbitration. 
Disputes to be submitted to international arbitration, either to the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) established by the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 
opened for signature at Washington DC on 18 March 1965, when 
each Contracting Party has become a party to said Convention; (As 
long as this requirement is not met, each Contracting Party agrees 
that the dispute may be settled under the rules governing the 
Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the 
Secretariat of ICSID) or 
an international arbitrator or adhoc arbitration tribunal to be 
appointed by a special agreement or established under the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission of 
International Trade Law. 
 
Disputes to be submitted to international arbitration, either to  
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) established by the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States, opened for signature at Washington 
DC on 18 March 1965, when each Contracting Party has 
become a party to said Convention; (As long as this 
requirement is not met, each Contracting Party agrees that the 
dispute may be settled under the rules governing the 
Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by 
the Secretariat of ICSID) or an international arbitrator or ad 
hoc arbitral tribunal to be established by agreement between 
the parties to the dispute. 
 
 
Sunset clause In respect of investments made prior to termination, 
continues in effect for 10 years. 
In respect of investments made prior to termination, continues in 
effect for 20 years. 
In respect of investments made prior to termination, continues 
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